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ABSTRACT
A New Search-and-Matching Computable General Equilibrium Model: Progressive
Consumption Taxation and Unemployment Equilibrium Effects on Growth,
Unemployment, and Incidence
by
Victor del Carpio Neyra
I develop a model that includes a search-and-matching model of unemployment equi-
librium with endogenous wage bargaining in the labor market to evaluate consumption tax
reforms in the U.S.. I also improve such framework to examine consumption tax reforms
with progressive components –a Hall-Rabushka style flat tax and the Bradford X-tax– and
to measure their impact on different income groups instead of a single representative indi-
vidual.
My model simulates the long-term effects (from a benchmark to a steady state equilib-
rium) of reforms with income-heterogeneous individuals, in a closed economy. This study
contributes to the literature by accounting simultaneously for the unemployment equilib-
rium effects and income heterogeneity in a consumption-based reform; and by doing so, it
provides a more robust base for the analysis of the efficiency and incidence of tax reforms. I
use the model to test if growth, capital accumulation and economic efficiency that typically
occur under standard CGE analyses of consumption tax reforms are enhanced or reduced
with the addition of a search-and-matching labor market framework. I also analyze if such
reforms are distributionally neutral or if they affect income groups disproportionately. Fi-
nally, by evaluating two consumption tax reforms with different progressive tax structures
–which include only a standard deduction (the flat tax) or progressive marginal tax rates
(the X-tax)– I analyze the impact of such differences in the results.
iii
Both, the flat tax and the X-tax, lead to an average reduction in after-tax bargained
wages. However, they also leave firms in better conditions to create more jobs by opening
more vacancies, which consequently, also lead to a reduction in the level of unemploy-
ment. Therefore, the inclusion of unemployment equilibrium counters in some degree the
decrease in the aggregate individual labor supply, caused by the reforms’ implementation,
by reducing the unemployment level and increasing the total employed labor.
The X-tax, which keeps roughly the same average income tax due to its progressive tax
schedule, has a lower impact on lower and middle-income groups than the flat tax. The
last increases the average income tax for all income groups except the top decile, reducing
wages more than the X-tax. Nevertheless, in both scenarios, it is the top two percent who
obtains the largest increase in welfare, measured by its equivalent variation.
Contrary to standard results, capital drops. Vacancies, now considered by firms as
investment projects that increase their effective labor, compete with capital for resources,
thus reducing the level of capital accumulation compared with a standard CGE model with a
competitive labor market. Also, since the model only analyzes the state-state equilibrium,
it misses the gains from reforms on old capital, besides the new investment expensing.
Capital has the largest drop with the X-tax, which has an increase in the business income tax
rate of five percent points to match the highest individual income tax rate. Capital reduces
less that the flat tax because it also has a reduction in the business tax rate of four percent
points. Additionally, output only increases under the X-tax, because the unemployment
reduction does not compensate the large drop in the aggregate individual labor under the
flat tax.
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1Chapter 1
Search-and-Matching CGE Modelling To Analyze
Consumption Tax Reforms: Unemployment Equilibrium
Effects on Efficiency and Incidence
1.1 Introduction
The advantages (and disadvantages) of replacing the current U.S. national tax system with
a consumption-based tax has been widely discussed, and computable general equilibrium
(CGE) models have been a useful tool for its analysis.1 CGE estimates from consumption-
based tax reforms for the U.S. have shown considerable efficiency gains in output and
capital accumulation, especially in the long run. In particular, proportional consumption
tax reforms delivered significant increases in national income and capital stock (9.5 and
25.4 percent respectively (Altig et al. 2001)).
Transitional effects and neutrality of horizontal and vertical incidence are factors that
reduce, eliminate (or potentially could even reverse) the welfare increase achieved by the
efficiency gains in output and capital accumulation (Altig et al. 2001). Reform’s transitional
effects include changes in goods’ prices, wages, the value of debt and equity, and a one-
time windfall loss on previously owned capital (Bradford 1996). Its incidence might affect
the elderly (Bradford 1996), and lower income families and middle class (Mieszkowski
1A computable general equilibrium is a model that uses numerical methods to find its equilibrium. It is
widely used to analyze the effects changes in public policy variables (taxes, for instance) that affect different
markets simultaneously, and for which there is not enough data to perform a controlled experiment. For a
compendium of previous work and recent developments in CGE modeling see Dixon and Jorgenson (2013a,
2013b).
2and Palumbo 2002) disproportionally. For example, some proposals include a relief to pre-
viously owned capital, allowing to depreciate it temporarily following the previous rule.
Others include progressive components such as a standard deduction (Hall-Rabushka flat
tax (Hall and Rabushka 1983; Hall and Rabushka 2007)) or a progressive tax rate structure
(X tax (Bradford 1986; Bradford 2005)). Estimates have shown a considerable reduction
in the gains achieved by those reforms. For example, the X tax –a reform close to neutral
along the income distribution– reaches lower output and capital stock gains than a propor-
tional tax (3.1 and 4.4 percent less, respectively (Altig et al. 2001)). An additional increase
to finance a transitional relief might not only significantly reduce the efficiency gains of
the X-tax but also reverse its progressivity (Zodrow 2007, 60). The inclusion of a transi-
tional relief for previously owned capital in the flat tax reduces its gains roughly by half; its
national income reduces from 4.5 to 1.9 percent and its capital stock gains from 15 to 8.3
percent (Altig et al. 2001). Additionally, in the long run, the flat tax’s standard deduction
only benefits the lowest and highest two percent of the population when it includes the tran-
sitional relief; the rest of the population is slightly worse off. Thus, larger efficiency gains
come at the expense of welfare losses when transitional effects and incidence neutrality are
accounted. That could diminish considerably the incentive to change to a consumption tax
base (Gravelle 2002, 26).
Nonetheless, these results are based on the assumption that the labor market reaches
a competitive equilibrium; wage and work hours supplied are optimal, and therefore la-
bor market efficiency and incidence is measured including changes in wages and amount
of hours destined to work away from the competitive equilibrium. Once this assumption
is dropped, the efficiency and incidence results of a consumption-based tax reform could
markedly change. The existence of unemployment in equilibrium implies that the equilib-
rium allocation is not a first-best market-clearing allocation anymore. Thus, public policy
3instruments that were considered distortionary in the context of a competitive labor market
can now improve the welfare of individuals.
Under unemployment equilibrium, efficiency losses in the labor market due to a re-
duction in the hours supplied or the inclusion of progressive tax components have to be
balanced with efficiency gains obtained from unemployment reduction. Similarly, in the
context of unemployment equilibrium, unemployment insurance plays a significant role in
the decision of work hours supplied.
Regarding efficiency analysis, the inclusion of unemployment equilibrium moderates
the labor substitution caused by the reform implementation and enhanced by the inclusion
of progressive components, in the long run. In this scenario, despite that a reduction in
after-tax wages (due to the reform) might drop the individuals’ supply of working hours,
it also pressures wages downwards. Thus, it lowers the labor costs and increases firms’
marginal rent from labor, which incentives the opening of job vacancies, and leads to a
reduction in the unemployment rate. By the same logic, this model also moderates the
effects of progressive components, which enhance the labor substitution effect caused by
the reform.Additionally, the inclusion of unemployment insurance in the model is also vital.
While it reduces the impact of unemployment on individuals’ consumption and savings
(by reducing the variability of their budget), it also reduces individuals’ labor participation
and job search effort (Tatsiramos and van Ours 2012); hence, it provides more leverage
to people to bargain an increase in their wages. If the unemployment insurance is large
enough, the increase in wages and consequent reduction in firms’ marginal rent could offset
any positive effect of a progressive reform on unemployment. It reduces the individuals’
incentives to provide labor due to the increase in their non-wage income but also reduces
the regressive incidence of consumption taxes on lower and middle-income groups.
4Concerning incidence analysis, the inclusion of income heterogeneity accounts for id-
iosyncratic effects on wages for different income groups in a context of steady-state un-
employment equilibrium. Lower income groups have a larger incentive to change their
unemployment status; thus they have a lower leverage to bargain their wages. As a re-
sult, any pressure to reduce wages will have a larger impact on lower income groups than
high-income ones. Therefore, if the effect of the drop in wages is large, the positive effect
of progressive tax rates and consequent unemployment reduction on lower-income groups
(explained in the previous paragraph) could shrink. The inclusion of unemployment in-
surance also affects individual’s welfare under a consumption tax reform. In this case, the
unemployment insurance benefits lower income groups more than high-income ones, by
increasing their leverage to obtain larger wages and reducing the wage-reduction effect.
The result on the welfare of each income group depends on which effect predominates.
The aggregate effect on unemployment, growth, and consumption would depend on the
net effect on each income group. Different income groups will be affected differently by
tax policies, facing different potential gains from a job match; thus they will be subject to
different bargained wages, affecting the overall efficiency and incidence of the reform.
Previous CGE models had not yet analyzed the effects of consumption-based reforms
in the U.S. considering unemployment equilibrium in their modeling, although a departure
from the assumption of a competitive labor market is essential. The primary goal of this
study is to include a search-and-matching model of unemployment equilibrium with en-
dogenous wage bargaining in the labor market to evaluate U.S. consumption tax reforms.2
2In unemployment equilibrium models with efficiency wages (Shapiro and Stiglitz 1984), firms offer
wages larger than the competitive market ones to infuse higher levels of effort in workers; costs increase as
a consequence of higher wages reducing the number of employees and producing unemployment in equilib-
rium. In the case of collective bargaining models (McDonald and Solow 1981), wages are bargained between
the union and the firm, and workers decide between the wage offered by the union or the possible alterna-
tive outside the sector; the larger wages obtained from the rents shared during the bargaining also produce
unemployment in the equilibrium.
5Also, improve such framework to examine consumption tax reforms with progressive com-
ponents –a Hall-Rabushka style flat tax and the Bradford X-tax– and to measure their im-
pact on different income groups instead of a single representative individual.
It simulates the long-term efficiency effects and incidence of the reform (from a bench-
mark to a steady state equilibrium), in a closed economy with income-heterogeneous indi-
viduals. The use of a search-and-matching equilibrium responds to two important frame-
work requirements for the object of this study; one is the need to incorporate the effects of
unemployment in the tax reform endogenously; the other is the allowance of income hetero-
geneity in the process of wage determination. In the search-and-matching framework I use,
unemployment is the result of the existence of labor market frictions; finding the appropri-
ate match for a job is costly to firms, it takes time, and those matches last for a finite lapse.
Thus, there is always a fraction of the population unemployed at any time as a consequence
of those frictions. Also, the wage agreed is the result of the bargaining of firms and indi-
viduals (Pissarides 2000) on how to split the potential gains obtained from the job match;
individuals obtain gains from getting a job, and firms obtain profits out of filling its vacant
position. Income heterogeneity is reflected in the value set on employment by individuals
and hence, also influences the wage bargaining process. By simultaneously accounting for
the unemployment equilibrium effects and income heterogeneity in a consumption-based
reform, this study provides a more robust base for the analysis of tax reforms’ efficiency
and incidence.
The ambiguity in the overall efficiency and incidence effects of a consumption-based
reform in unemployment equilibrium points out two important aspects of labor market
modeling: the complementarity between tax reform and unemployment insurance poli-
cies (Shimer and Smith 2001; Lehmann and Van der Linden 2007); and the necessity of
an accurate measurement of individual labor supply responses (Gravelle 2002). In other
6words, a consumption-based reform could achieve a large degree of progressivity and ef-
ficiency, but depending on a certain level of unemployment benefits and individuals’ labor
supply responses (Sørensen 1999). My model accounts for the complementarity of tax
reforms and unemployment insurance by modeling individual’s decisions on consumption
and savings assuming they are income heterogeneous and introducing bargained wages and
unemployment in equilibrium. It also measures of individual labor supply responses more
accurately by using individuals’ utility preferences that allow for lower individual labor
supply elasticities, which are more common in the empirical literature. Lower labor supply
elasticities have a lower effect on output; hence using large elasticities would overstate the
behavioral effect of the reform (Gravelle 2002). Since my model also takes into account the
effect of the extensive margin of labor, employment and output effects in the long-run can
still be large even under the assumption of low labor supply elasticities. In general, if the
combination of positive efficiency effects of progressive consumption-based reforms, and
the moderation of efficiency losses due to the substitution of labor for leisure are signifi-
cant, the long-run benefits of a consumption tax reform might compensate for transitional
concerns; while supporting the use (Koskela and Vilmunen 1996; Pissarides 1998), and op-
timality of progressive taxation (Lehmann, Parmentier, and Van Der Linden 2011). Given
the existence of opposite forces determining the level of wages and unemployment, and the
complexity of the model, the result is not clear without a simulation of the reform.
In this chapter, I discuss the framework for the development of the new model. First,
I describe the search-and-matching unemployment equilibrium model. Next, I explain the
core of proposals of consumption-based reforms, including some of which I apply in the
second chapter. Finally, I provide insight on how the inclusion of this type of unemploy-
ment equilibrium changes the results of consumption-based reform analysis. The conclud-
7ing section summarizes, mentions some caveats in the modeling, and proposes paths of
future research.
1.2 Search-and-Matching General Equilibrium
Search-and-matching models have its precedent in one-sided job search modeling (McCall
1970), which is concerned with individuals’ labor supply decision based on their expected
gains from accepting a job offer or continue unemployed. In a search-and-matching set-up,
firms’ decision process is also taken into account. Hence, a search-and-matching frame-
work adopts a general equilibrium approach, in which the objective of unemployed indi-
viduals and firms with job vacancies is also to find a good job match (Pissarides 2010),
and expected gains are split in their bargained wage (Diamond 1982; Mortensen 1982). In
that context, labor market frictions make the matching objective more difficult, producing
a rough transition towards employment. Decisions occur in a decentralized labor market;
individuals and firms internalize the unemployment and wage-bargaining mechanism to
choose their labor demand and supply accordingly.
1.2.1 Job Vacancies and Unemployment Equilibrium
The population that participates in the labor market is either employed or unemployed,
and they will either change their employment status or keep it. The population that be-
comes unemployed, the employment outflow (or unemployment inflow), is determined, in
my model, exogenously.3 The employment outflow is caused by productivity shocks that
break-up a fraction of previously matched jobs. The percentage of employed individu-
als that become unemployed is known as the separation rate. The employment outflow is
3See Pissarides (2000) for endogenous employment outflow, and on the job employment search.
8an important characteristic of the labor market because it assures the existence of unem-
ployment in steady state equilibrium; without a positive separation rate, despite there are
individuals left unmatched in every period, everyone would be eventually hired in the long
term, and therefore, unemployment would not exist.
The population that becomes employed, the employment inflow (or unemployment out-
flow), is modeled using the matching function. The matching function, similar to a pro-
duction function, represents the technology that determines the rate at which job matches
occur, known as matching rate, based on combinations of unemployment and vacancy rates
as inputs, and parameters that introduce the effects of labor market frictions in the out-
come (Pissarides 2000, 6). Frictions is the jargon that refers to job search and time costs,
market congestion, availability of virtual or physical spaces that facilitate the labor market
exchange, and compatibility between job candidates and vacancies. These frictions reflect
the fact that finding a good match is a costly endeavor. Even if the number of firms posting
a vacancy is smaller than the number of unemployed individuals, and vice-versa, not all
vacancies are necessarily filled, or unemployed individuals employed at a given period. In
the matching function I use, there are two friction parameters.4 One measures the job mar-
ket’s matching efficiency, such as the extent of availability of virtual or physical spaces that
facilitate the labor exchange, or the compatibility between the skills offered by individuals
and the ones demanded by the firms. The more efficient the market is, the larger is the
matching rate. The other friction parameter measures the sensitivity of the matching rate
to positive (and negative) externalities created by a relative increase in the number of firm
vacancies or unemployed individuals (Petronglo and Pissarides 2001). A larger number of
vacancies reduces the competition for the same position among individuals, but it also in-
creases the competition among firms to fill those vacancies. In other words, it measures the
4I am using a Cobb-Douglas matching function.
9sensitivity to market congestion, and the net effect on the matching rate depends on which
congestion effect predominates. For example, if the congestion for firms is high (low for
individuals), but the sensitivity towards unemployment’s externality is low (high towards
vacancies), then firms’ high congestion outweighs the reduced individual’s congestion.
A simple way to represent this market congestion is using the vacancy to unemployment
ratio, known as market tightness. It reflects the congestion, or tightness that firms and
individuals face when the number of job vacancies relative to the number of unemployed
workers increases or decreases. A high vacancy to unemployment ratio, that is a high
market tightness, increases firms mutual congestion to choose their best match but reduces
the congestion of individuals who have more vacancy availability in relative terms. The
opposite happens when the vacancy to unemployment ratio is low. The market tightness
also embeds the information about the inputs of the matching function. Unemployment
is determined endogenously in equilibrium; however, vacancy rates are affected by firms’
labor demand decisions. Firm’s decision on the equilibrium vacancy rate level is a crucial
determinant of the market tightness, the matching rate, and equilibrium unemployment. To
determine their vacancy requirement firms need to know the labor force they will count with
for their production process; their decision relies on a vacancy rate adjustment mechanism
to the equilibrium employed (hence, unemployed) population. In other words, firms decide
their optimal market tightness. Firms choose their optimal market tightness by opening
vacancies until the point where the marginal profit they could obtain by filling them is
equal to the costs of opening them and keeping them open until they get filled. The steady
state equilibrium is summarized in the job creation equation, represented in figures 1.1
and 1.2.
The steady state equilibrium between employment inflow and outflow –when they are
offset– is summarized in the Beveridge equation, represented in figure 1.1. The Beveridge
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equation, along with the job creation equation determines the equilibrium vacancy and
unemployment rates (figure 1.1). The equilibrium of vacancies and unemployment is a
combination of the optimal vacancy decisions by the firm, and the labor market structure
which include the market frictions. A useful way of think about it is that firms decide their
optimal vacancy rate by making benefits equal to the costs, considering the fact that they
will not be able to fill all of them. That is, firms internalize the matching process of the
labor market. Vacancy rates and employment rates of equilibrium are the result, and hence
unemployment equilibrium as well. For example, in figure 1.1, an increase in the separa-
tion rate would shift the Beveridge curve to the right, which also increases the number of
vacancies available (firms need to cover those positions that were left open), and structural
unemployment, given that some individuals became unemployed. A decrease in the market
efficiency would have the same effect. Both results are represented by a movement from
point A to C. Changes in the sensitivity to market congestion -to either unemployment or
vacancy rates- would modify the shape of the Beveridge curve. The congestion effect that
prevails, for firms or individuals, depends on the market tightness, which is the slope of
the job creation curve. For example, in equilibrium D, after a decrease in the sensitivity
towards unemployment, the lower congestion for firms produced by the lower vacancy rate
outweighs the increased congestion for unemployed individuals who need to compete for
fewer vacancies available. Thus, the level of unemployment drops. The opposite occurs in
equilibrium D’, where the vacancy rate is so high that the increased congestion for firms
outweighs the lower congestion for individuals, increasing unemployment. On the job cre-
ation curve, a reduction in the average costs of job-fitting candidate’s search would increase
the number of new job openings or the time the vacancy is kept open; consequently, the
matching rate increases and unemployment drops. This movement in the job creation curve
is represented by a movement from point A to B in figure 1.1.
11
Figure 1.1 : Equilibrium vacancies and unemployment.
unemployment
vacancies
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Individuals also maximize their utility contingent on being employed or unemployed;
if employed they choose optimal hours of labor supply. The aggregate labor supply repre-
sents the total number of hours supplied in the economy in each a period, and from which
labor market mechanism will employ a certain fraction in equilibrium, which will become
the effectively employed labor force, later used by firms in their productive process. If
individuals’ labor supply decreases in the aggregate, firms will try to increase their market
tightness by opening vacancies to keep the same level of profit (a movement from point A
to B in figure 1.1), which leads to a reduction in the unemployment rate. Nevertheless, the
most significant influence of individuals and their income heterogeneity is accounted in the
wage determination process.
1.2.2 Bargaining and Wage Determination
The wage determination process has its origin in bargaining theory (Nash 1950; Binmore,
Rubinstein, and Wolinsky 1986; Shaked and Sutton 1984). The idea behind the wage
12
setting is that the labor exchange produces a surplus, and the wage set determines how it
will be split between employees and firms.
Labor market frictions create a monopolistic power during the job matching (Pissarides
2000) allowing firms and individuals to bargain for a larger share of the surplus. The wage
agreed, represented in the wage equation (figure 1.2), maximizes the joint gains of firms
and individuals extracted from their job agreement, weighted by their respective power,
the Nash bargaining solution. In equilibrium, the marginal benefits and loses, either to
individuals and firms, from a change in wages are offset.
To determine the gains, each participant determines the value they extract if they reach
and agreement and when they do not. Based on the contingent benefits (or costs) they
obtain under either employment or unemployment or having a vacancy filled or not, in-
dividuals and firms calculate the value of being in each state. For individuals, the value
is the expected value obtained in their lifetime, considering that in each period they can
be either employed or unemployed. The value of being employed represents the current
benefit (utility) extracted from being employed and the discounted value of either being
employed or unemployed the next period. Similarly for the unemployment state. In the
case of firms, the value is the expected value obtained while economy produces, which is
infinite, considering that vacancies can be filled or not. The differences between the value
of being employed and being unemployed, and between the value of filling a vacancy or
not, which are the gains from changing to one status to the other, represent the surplus pro-
duced by the filled position when a wage agreement is reached. The larger the difference,
the easier is for each to concede more surplus. A substantial wage increases the value of
being employed to individuals, while it reduces the value of filling the vacancy to firms, and
vice-versa. Hence if a public policy reduces their difference, they will try to compensate it
by bargaining higher or lower wages respectively. Then each difference is then weighted
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by adding their respective bargaining parameter as an exponent. Finally, the product of the
weighted differences represents the mutual gains from the agreement.
The wage agreed is a function not only of the bargaining parameter, but also of the
variables and other parameters that determine the individuals’ value of being employed or
unemployed, and firms’ value of filling the vacancy or not. The wage equation, along with
the job creation equation determine the equilibrium wages and market tightness (figure
1.2). For example, an increase in unemployment insurance also increases the value of
being unemployed, reducing the individual gains from employment, pushing wages up to
compensate for that loss. Also, an increase in the bargaining power of individuals would
increase the slope of the wage curve, increasing wages. All those changes also reduce the
number of vacancies available to unemployed individuals, reflected in a market tightness
decrease. This reduction in market tightness leads to higher unemployment. The effect of
an increase in the wage curve slope is represented by a movement from point A to B in
figure 1.2.
Figure 1.2 : Equilibrium wage and market tightness.
wages
Job creation
Wage curve
market tightness
A
B
C
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However, some of the parameters would change both curves given that the wages bar-
gained depend on the profitability of the vacancy, and the profit maximization of the firm.
For example, an increase in the costs of keeping the vacancy open increases the gains of
filling it. Hence firms can offer larger wages for any given market tightness they face.
Thus it increases the slope of the wage equation. At the same time, this also reduces the
marginal profitability of the firm since it increases their costs. This shifts the job creation
curve leftwards pushing wages down. The net result of wages is ambiguous, but vacan-
cies and market tightness reduce undoubtedly since both increase the firms’ costs. This
equilibrium in represents by point C in figure 1.2.
1.3 Consumption-based Tax Reforms
1.3.1 Characteristics of Consumption-based Tax Reforms
A consumption-based tax is a tax which base is equivalent to a consumption tax one. The
difference between income and consumption bases is their treatment of capital income.
While they are taxed twice in the income tax –once when the income is received and again
when capital income yield is withdrawn– a consumption tax is taxed only once (Gale 2005).
Under the premise that any income is either consumed, saved or invested, a tax on income
that is neither saved or invested is equivalent to a tax on today’s consumption; and a tax on
savings withdrawal or investment withdrawal, taxes future consumption. This approach is
known as consumed income taxation. Another approach taxes all income once, avoiding
taxing savings and investment yield again, known as yield exemption. In any case, capital
income is taxed only once.5
5Consumption-based taxes exempt only normal (risk-free) returns; above-normal returns are taxed (Hub-
bard 2005, 83).
15
For the last three decades, fundamental consumption-based tax reforms have been pro-
posed as an alternative to the current system based on the grounds of simplification, in-
creased efficiency, and fairness (Auerbach and Hassett 2005; Henry J. Aaron and Steuerle
2007; Diamond and Zodrow 2008). The different treatment of savings by a consumption
tax compared to an income tax system improves efficiency since it avoids any interference
with individuals’ allocation of consumption across time.6 In consumption-based tax re-
forms, investments are fully expensed. Thus the effective marginal tax rate on them is zero.
As a result, consumption-based taxes not only eliminate allocation inefficiencies among
individuals’ with tendencies to either save or consume but also enhance economic growth
through increased investment rates.
However, only the investments produced after the reform enactment are expensed, there
is an implicit tax on the capital invested before the adoption of the reform. Since new
investments have higher returns given the tax expense, they comparatively reduce the re-
turn of previous investments, which continue paying taxes based on its depreciated value.
Transitional rules –understood as extending depreciation rules for capital, used before the
reform (Altig et al. 2001)– can be applied to prevent a one-time windfall to previously
purchased capital. Progressivity of consumption taxes also has been a concern since the
proportion of income destined to consumption is larger than the one to savings among
lower income groups. Another critical component of the capital levy is its relationship with
older generations which commonly own a larger share of invested capital.
Housing is considered an investment under consumption-based taxation. Therefore,
housing can be taxed preemptively either when is bought or it can be expensed and the
capital gains and imputed rent included in the tax base. In practice, however, all flat tax
6The efficient intertemporal consumption allocation assumes no change in interest rates and tax rates, and
that individuals consume all their income in their lifetime (Brown 1948).
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and X tax proposals excluded the imputed rent as a part of the base, given that it is not fea-
sible to measure it accurately. Bradford’s (2005) proposed solution was to tax housing and
consumer durables as consumption goods. This is equivalent to deduct it as an investment,
and then tax it at the moment of consumption as imputed rent. When the imputed rent is
excluded from the tax base, there is a reduction in the tax burden for house owners com-
pared with rental housing. Approximately 50 percent of the capital stock is composed by
housing (Altig et al. 2001, n. 586), thus an exemption creates an extra levy on non-housing
capital and a larger tax rate for everyone. On the other hand, the option to tax housing and
is not popular among people since it increases prices in the housing sector.
1.3.2 Two-tier Consumption-based Taxes: The Flat Tax and the X-Tax
Two alternatives to proportional consumption taxes, the yield exemption taxes, are the flat
tax and X tax. In the flat tax and the X-tax, labor expenses are deducted from the base and
taxed directly to individuals, such as wages, salaries, and pensions. After the deduction, the
base left –the business component– is taxed in a similar fashion to a proportional consump-
tion tax; while the wages, salaries, and pensions –the compensation component (Bradford
2005)– are taxed at the individual level resembling an income tax. This separation provides
an alternative that allows the introduction of progressivity in a more effective and efficient
way than through rebates, differential commodity taxation, or only transfers. Both taxes
exclude financial assets but include business ones.
The flat tax, proposed by Robert Hall and Alvin Rabushka (1983, 2007) applies the
same proportional statutory rate to businesses and individuals. The business tax base is
composed of the difference between all sales of goods and services, and purchases from
other firms. Investments such as plant, equipment, land, intangibles such as copyrights and
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Table 1.1 : Flat tax proposals.
Standard deduction Hall & Rabushka Rep. Armey Sen. Shelby
Married individuals filling jointly $14,501 $31,774 $32,386
Singles $8,888 $15,887 $16,193
Heads of household $13,098 $20,786 $20,675
Additional for each dependent $1,754 $7,424 $6,976
Flat tax 19 % 17%a 17%b
a 20% for taxable years previous to Jan. 1998.
b 19% for taxable years previous to Jan. 2005.
patents, and housing rental are treated as expenses, but includes its profits from investments
in plant, equipment, and land, and rental from housing or services.
Wages, salaries, and pensions deducted from the business component are taxed indi-
vidually, including a standard deduction for the lowest income bracket to keep the tax
progressive; that is, the effective tax rate for the lowest income bracket is zero. The com-
pensation tax base includes the actual payment of wages, salaries, and pension receipts;
savings are taxed at the receipt of the compensation, but not when withdrawn, hence they
are not double taxed. Fringe benefits are included, while interest payments (and receipts),
inheritances, and gifts are excluded. Flat tax proposals were introduced in legislation by
Rep. Richard Armey (U.S. Congress 1995) and Sen. Richard Shelby (U.S. Congress 2003)
in the U.S. Congress. Table 1.1 shows the flat tax proposals along with their corresponding
standard deductions, in 2013 dollars.7
The X tax is a variation of the flat tax in the sense that has progressive marginal rates
instead of a flat tax; proposed by David Bradford (1986, 329).8 The compensation tax has a
progressive marginal rate with a cap, for the highest income bracket, equal to the business
component tax rate. It may include tax credits for low-income households such as the
Earned Income Tax Credit (Bradford 2005, 14). The reason why the business component
7Calculated using the CPI Inflation Calculator of the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The original amounts
can be found in Hall and Rabushka (1983, 35) and U.S. Congress (1995, 2003).
8See also Bradford (2005) and Carroll and Viard (2012) for an extended description of the X tax.
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Table 1.2 : X-tax proposal.
Single filling income brackets X tax
< $47,713 15%
$47,713-$68,587 25%
> $68,587 35%
Businesses 35 %
matches the cap of the compensation tier is that if the compensation has a larger marginal
rate, then individuals can register as businesses and evade the difference. The X tax was
studied as an alternative by the President’s Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform (2005)
under the name of Progressive Consumption Tax. Table 1.2 shows the progressive tax rates
for single filling, in 2013 dollars; for married filing the income amounts double.9
Although it is known that flat rate consumption-based taxes are commonly regressive,
some alternatives had introduced different degrees of progressivity at an individual level of
taxation. In particular, the flat tax and the X tax are options that address the regressive na-
ture of a consumption-based tax reform, while keeping its benefits on growth and efficiency
at the same time.
1.4 A New Model To Analyze Efficiency and Incidence of Consump-
tion Tax Reforms
1.4.1 The Unemployment Equilibrium Effects
Most of the literature studies of the effects of tax reforms on unemployment equilibrium had
focused on labor tax changes (Pissarides 1998; Bovenberg, Graafland, and De Mooij 2000;
Heijdra and Ligthart 2004; Michaelis and Birk 2006) and their progressivity (Pissarides
9Calculated using the CPI Inflation Calculator of the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The original amounts
can be found in the President’s Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform (2005, 183).
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1998; Sørensen 1999). In a search-and-matching framework, the basic premise is that any
labor substitution effect consequence of a tax change will also be accompanied by an effect
on the unemployment rate in the same direction. That is, for example, if the tax increases
and labor supply reduces, the level of unemployment reduces as well. The explanation
is that a reduction in the after-tax wage reduces the cost of the individual to concede a
lower pre-tax wage during the bargaining, while it increases the cost of the firm to increase
the after-tax wages (Sørensen 1999, 445). In other words, for any percentage increase in
wages, the percentage received by the individual is lower; thus, the increase will not change
individual’s utility as much. While for firms, for any percentage increase in the after-tax
wages, the percentage increase in the pre-tax wage has to be larger; thus, it would reduce
its marginal profit from a filled vacancy more than before. This translates to a reduction of
the wage curve slope, which reduces wages and increases market tightness. The increase
of market tightness increases the probability of being hired and reduces unemployment.
Pissarides (1998) shows that the magnitude of the effects of a change in wage taxes
on wages and unemployment –a tax cut in that case– depends on the structure of the un-
employment compensation. When the compensation is fixed the slope of the individual
labor supply curve is less inclined than the case with a variable compensation. The policy
consequences are that a tax cut with a variable unemployment compensation would have
a larger effect increasing wages than reducing unemployment, transferring the burden of
the tax cuts on the unemployed that have relatively a deterioration in their living standards.
Similarly, he shows that a change in the structure of taxation, more or less progressive,
does not have an effect on unemployment when the model is a competitive equilibrium
one. In that case, the analysis of tax policy using different progressive systems would now
show their difference in terms on how much unemployment can be reduced, vis-a-vis a
reduction in work incentives and productivity, using the same structure of unemployment
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compensation. Sørensen (1999) finds that the degree of progressivity that can be achieved
could be quite large, but that it depends on the level of unemployment compensation. The
reasoning behind is that since in a model of imperfect labor competition and increased
progressivity produces a trade-off between unemployment reduction along with less indi-
vidual labor supply (effort and productivity). The consequences regarding policy are that
an increased progressive system might have to be accompanied by a reduction in unem-
ployment compensation to set off the effects or not increase unemployment. Picard and
Toulemonde (2003) show that if taxes are progressive and nonlinear, the effects on un-
employment are different; since the revenue effect might offset the wage effect and the
increase in the average rate.
The effects of consumption-based tax reforms had not been tested using search-and-
matching unemployment equilibrium with income-heterogeneous individuals. The wage
effect is expected to be similar, however since the structure of unemployment insurance
in U.S. is indexed by wages, it is anticipated to have a larger effect on wages than in
unemployment (Pissarides 1998). Also, since the taxation is nonlinear, the revenue effect
is expected to be larger than the wage effect (Picard and Toulemonde 2003). Also, the
reduction of double taxation of capital income would reduce the tax base and increase
unemployment (Michaelis and Birk 2006). However, since consumption tax reforms are
usually accompanied by the elimination of deductions, depreciation allowances, and other
base-broadening policies, any reduction in the tax base must be balanced with those base-
broadening effects. On the individuals’ side, the net effect depends on variables such as
the income elasticity of labor supply. A correction on the level of this variable which
empirically shows small would reduce the change this effect. But similarly, it reduces the
impact that an increase in wages has on the incentives to work due to an increase in labor
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demand. This portion is corrected using a functional form for the utility that does not have
an income elasticity of labor supply equal to one, more on the flavor of Sørensen (1999).
In the case that the consumption-based tax reform disincentives the individual labor
supply, even by a small amount, it reduces the mark-up gains obtained from a filled vacancy,
increasing the push to reduce the wages by firms. This moves slope of wage equation down,
reducing wages and also increases market tightness since it would be profitable to increase
the number of vacancies given the cost reduction. Also, enhances the effect produced
by the reduction in the marginal gains of being employed by individuals, hence reducing
unemployment more. However, the decrease in the slope is partially moderated by also a
decrease in the marginal gains of a vacancy filled which gives the incentive to give up part
of the profit for a higher wage.
Looking at the job creation equation, on one side this change in labor supply reduces
its slope, hence reducing wages more and also market tightness since some vacancies will
be closed due to some loss of the gains from keeping them filled. The net result would
depend on which effect is larger, however, we have not considered yet the effects of other
change of variables on the job creation equation such as investment expensing and its effect
on capital accumulation. What seems to happen almost with no doubt is the reduction in
wages. This added to the shift of the tax to the consumer can affect lower income brackets.
On the side of incidence, the effect of progressive taxation plays a major role. Pro-
gressive taxation increases also their incentive to work more than it does on higher income
brackets. Similarly, the increase in the tax rate to have progressive taxation expands the
effects mentioned in the previous paragraph related to the efficiency effects.
The previous analysis of the wage equation also considers the effect of a standard de-
duction or a progressive marginal income tax rate. For example, an increase in the marginal
income tax progression reduces the marginal gains from bargaining and wages and in-
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Figure 1.3 : Equilibrium wage and market tightness: effect of a increase in progressivity.
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creases unemployment, but at the same time, it also alleviates firms from labor costs, po-
tentially increasing the number of vacancies and the probability to get hired. Figure (1.3)
shows the direct effect on the wage curve, and the second order effect on the individual
labor supply, keeping the wage level constant. The X-tax and the flat tax have not been
scrutinized using imperfect labor markets. The main difference with the results extracted
using a competitive labor market come from the wage equation. Any effect in the marginal
gains (obtained from employment or vacancy filling), that is, the rents bargained between
individuals and firms, determine a wage response counter arresting this effect.
Similarly, a consumption-based reform is expected to increase capital and savings,
through the expensing of firm’s investment and exemption of savings taxation. On indi-
viduals, it increases the benefits of employment, increasing hours of work, and balancing
the disincentives to individual labor supply. Hence, it produces an opposite effect that
increases labor market tightness. On firms, it also reduces the marginal cost of capital, di-
minishing the previous effect. Depending which effect prevails over the market tightness,
the consumption-based tax reform could increase or decrease the unemployment level. Rel-
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Figure 1.4 : Equilibrium vacancies and unemployment: effect of a increase in market tight-
ness.
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evant parameters to determine the magnitude of the effects are the elasticity of labor supply,
the elasticity of factor substitution, and the replacement rate. Figure (1.4) shows the case
when the effect on employment is positive.
It also must be taken into account that now vacancies are considered by firms as invest-
ment projects that increase their effective labor, competing with capital for resources, and
reducing the level of capital accumulation compared with a standard CGE model with a
competitive labor market. Also, since the model only analyzes the state-state equilibrium,
it misses the gains from reforms on old capital, besides the new investment expensing.
1.5 Conclusion
For all these reasons, a departure from the assumption of a competitive labor market is
essential to CGE consumption-based tax reform modeling. The inclusion of structural un-
employment into CGE modeling enriches the analysis of public policy’s effects on unem-
ployment and welfare, particularly the combined effect of tax and unemployment benefit
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policies. Given the different implications of public policy through imperfect labor mar-
ket compared with a standard one, such inclusion provides a more accurate measurement
of the effects of these policies on efficiency and incidence, and additional light about the
advantages and disadvantages of different reforms (e.g. tax reforms) and its overall ef-
fect on welfare. Given the main role of tax policy and unemployment insurance in the
search-and-matching framework, the proposed model can be used for both, tax and unem-
ployment insurance, policy reform analysis. The objective of this chapter is to point out the
advantages to use a model of this nature, mixing this two branches of literature. The model
should be able to test if growth, capital accumulation and economic efficiency that typically
occur under standard CGE analyses of consumption tax reforms are enhanced or reduced
with the addition of a search-and-matching labor market framework. Also, analyze if such
reforms are distributionally neutral or if they affect income groups disproportionately. Fi-
nally, by evaluating two consumption tax reforms with different progressive tax structures
–which include only a standard deduction (the flat tax) or progressive marginal tax rates
(the X-tax)– analyze the impact of such differences in the results.
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Chapter 2
Evaluating Consumption Tax Reforms in a CGE Model
with Unemployment and Income-Heterogeneous
Individuals in the U.S.
2.1 Introduction
I simulate the effects of the enactment of two comprehensive consumption-based (or “con-
sumption tax”) tax reforms in the United States, a Hall-Rabushka style flat tax and the
Bradford X-tax. Numerous studies have simulated the economic effects of such reforms
in the U.S., but always within the context of a full employment model and often under the
assumption of a single representative individual (or a single individual in each generation
in the case of overlapping generations models). By comparison, my analysis includes a
search-and-matching model of unemployment in the labor market with endogenous wage
bargaining. Within this context, I examine the long-run effects of these reforms, including
those in the labor market, as well as the distributional effects on twelve different income
groups.
In a search-and-matching framework, labor market frictions result in unemployment
in equilibrium, and the nature of that equilibrium is affected by the tax system. Conse-
quently, the enactment of a tax reform such as the replacement of the income tax with a
consumption tax could –in addition to its many other effects– increase economic efficiency
by reducing unemployment. In this context, for example, if the reform leads to a reduction
of the marginal utility that individuals obtain from an after-tax wage increase, it becomes
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optimal for firms and individuals to agree to a lower wage rate during the bargaining pro-
cess, and potentially, for individuals to reduce their labor supply. At the same time, lower
wages also could reduce the firm’s marginal cost of hiring another individual, which leads
to the opening of more vacancies, and a less congested market for individuals. As a re-
sult, the individuals’ chance to be matched increases, and the unemployment rate declines.
This effect on unemployment could mitigate the efficiency loss caused by any reduction of
individuals’ labor supply.
In the model I develop, the effects of the enactment of the various consumption tax re-
forms are disaggregated by income group, taking into account the fact that some groups will
have larger labor supply responses than others, and experience different changes in after-
tax wages. Therefore, the effects on each group’s consumption and savings decisions will
also be different. The estimated aggregate efficiency gains from reform (including those
from unemployment reduction) and the incidence of the reform differ from those simu-
lated in a model –with or without unemployment equilibrium– that assumes an exogenous
wage profile that is estimated separately or assumes an income-homogeneous population.
Additionally, average progressivity under the consumption tax reform will have a differ-
ent impact on the bargained wage depending on whether it arises due only to a standard
deduction (the flat tax) or due to progressive marginal tax rates (the X-tax).
The model is related to two well-established branches of the tax policy literature. The
first analyzes the efficiency of consumption tax reforms and incidence in models with
income-heterogeneous individuals but assumes competitive labor markets and full employ-
ment, where changes in labor supply are due primarily to individual optimization decisions
regarding the choice between leisure and work/consumption. These studies miss any ef-
ficiency gains or losses due to changes in the level of unemployment and changes in the
framework for wage bargaining. The second branch analyzes tax reforms using a search-
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and-matching unemployment equilibrium in the labor market and has been devoted almost
exclusively to analyzing labor tax reforms, ignoring issues of income distribution and the
general equilibrium effects of such reforms. The inclusion of a search-and-matching un-
employment equilibrium and income-heterogeneous individuals in a CGE model thus pro-
vides a more robust framework for measuring the effects of tax reforms than those currently
found in the literature. The analysis also provides policy makers with a better understand-
ing of the consequences of consumption tax reforms, including the effects of changes in
tax progressivity.
I first compare the effects of replacing the current progressive income tax system with a
distribution-neutral and revenue-neutral progressive X-tax reform. I measure the neutrality
in distribution by the equivalent variation of the tax reform on each income group. Under
this scenario, the effects reflect the change to a consumption-tax base in a model with
equilibrium unemployment, holding the degree of progressivity roughly constant. I then
analyze the enactment of a flat tax, focusing on the effects of changes in progressivity,
relative to the distributionally neutral X-tax reform. These simulations examine whether
the increases in growth, capital accumulation and economic efficiency that typically occur
under standard CGE analyses of such reform are enhanced or reduced remains in a search-
and-marching labor market framework. It also examines whether these reforms can be
distributionally neutral or if various income groups are being affected disproportionately.
The following section describes the search-and-matching framework utilized to model
the current tax system and the consumption-based reforms analyzed, as well as the other
features of the general equilibrium model of the economy that I use in the analysis. I then
present and interpret the results of the simulations.
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2.2 Model Structure
2.2.1 Individual’s Utility and Budget
I assume a closed economy with a population of N individuals (who may be either em-
ployed or unemployed), and a single production sector that combines capital and labor to
produce a single composite consumption good.1
Income groups
Individuals are distributed across twelve income brackets, indexed by y = {1, . . . , 12}.2
Each income group accounts for a decile of the population, except for income groups 1, 2,
11 and 12. The first and last income groups represent the lowest and highest two percent
of earners, while the second and eleventh percentiles represent the other eight percent of
the population in the first and last deciles. This approach allows me to analyze economic
incidence at both extremes of the income distribution and thus better observe any reform-
induced changes in income inequality.3 The population of each income group is denoted
by Ny, such that
∑
yNy = N .
Utility function
I define individuals’ utility over two periods. Current consumption, CPy , occurs in the first
period which represents one year, and future consumption, CFy , occurs in the second period,
which extends indefinitely from the end of the first period. Following Ballard et al. (1985),
in the first period, individuals decide to allocate their income between current consumption
1The modeling of individuals and firms’ behavior is an adaptation of the model constructed by Zodrow
and Diamond (2013).
2See Pechman and Okner (2000) and Fullerton and Rogers (1993) for a discussion of the advantages of
including annual and lifetime (respectively) income heterogeneity in incidence analysis.
3See, for example, Altig et al. (2001) and Zodrow and Diamond (2013).
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and savings used to finance future consumption. In the initial equilibrium each individ-
ual finances an increment in the expected annual flow of future consumption (CFy ) with
the return of capital services of newly produced capital goods bought with current period
savings. This approach assumes myopic expectations, under which the individual assumes
all prices will remain constant; current decisions regarding consumption and savings are a
function only of current prices. Savings in the current period are immediately transformed
into real assets. The rental of those assets increases the expected annual flow of capital ser-
vices for the rest of the second period, and that finances a constant increment in all future
annual consumption, CFy .
The consumption function Cy reflects a constant elasticity of substitution between
present (CPy ) and future consumption (C
F
y ), such that
Cy =
[
[ψC ]
1
ξ [CPy ]
ξ−1
ξ + [1− ψC ] 1ξ [CFy ]
ξ−1
ξ
] ξ
ξ−1
. (2.1)
The parameter ψC ∈ [0, 1] represents individuals’ weights on preferences for present and
future consumption. The parameter ξ ≥ 0 is the elasticity of substitution between present
and future consumption with respect to the interest rate.
Individual preferences are represented by a Greenwood–Hercowitz–Huffman utility
function denoted by Uy, which is increasing with respect to consumption utility, Cy, and
decreasing with respect of hours of work, Hy, such that:
Uy =
C
1+ 1
η
y
1 + 1
η
− ψHH
1+ 1
γ
y
1 + 1
γ
. (2.2)
The parameter ψH ∈ [0, 1] represents individuals’ weight on labor. The parameter γ ≥ 0
accounts for the intensity of the responsiveness of labor supply (at the intensive margin) to
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changes in after-tax wages. Larger values of γ imply larger values of the uncompensated
(and compensated) wage elasticity, ΘH,w (equation 2.50) and income elasticity of labor
supply, ΘH,Ω (equation 2.51)Analogously, η > 0 reflects the intensity of responsiveness of
consumption to good’s prices (Keane 2011, p. 966).
The primary advantage of the utility function (equation 2.2), relative to the more stan-
dard constant elasticity of substitution utility function, is that it allows the income elasticity
of labor supply to be different than one (equation 2.51), and closer to the values found in
the empirical literature, between -0.1 and zero (McClelland and Mok 2012). This income
elasticity of labor supply with respect to income, as well as the wage elasticities of labor
supply and consumption, can differ across individuals at different income levels.
If an individual is unemployed,Hy = 0, only the total consumption component remains
in the utility function:
Uy =
C
1+ 1
η
y
1 + 1
η
. (2.3)
Income and expenditures
Expenditures Consumers’ present and future net gross expenditures on goods and ser-
vices are equal to
[1 + τC ]pCPy ; and (2.4)
[1 + τC ]pCFy , (2.5)
where p denotes the price level of goods and services, and τC = αCτ con represents the
fraction αC of the tax τ con charged to consumers. This formulation allows tax exemptions
for certain goods - like medicine or food (e.g., as under current state sales taxes) - or for
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income or consumption tax preferences for the consumption of certain commodities, such
as owner-occupied housing under the current income tax. The flat tax and X-tax replace
the current tax charged to consumers, such that τ con = 0.
Wage income Wage income is equal to wyHy, where wy > 0 is the wage hourly rate.
The wage income tax base for an employed individual is equal to
Bey = wyHy − ωded, (2.6)
that is, gross wage income less the standard deduction. The current system, the X tax, and
the flat tax all include a standard deduction, denoted by ωded.
Payroll taxes, τ payy , include Social Security and Medicare taxes. I do not model on So-
cial Security taxes so that all income groups are taxed proportionally.4 Following Auerbach
and Kotlikoff (1987), the marginal wage income tax is composed by a proportional rate,
τ prpy , and a progressive factor, α
wBey (α
w ≥ 0), such that
τwy = τ
prp
y + α
w
y B
e
y, (2.7)
and αwy ≤ 1−τ
prp
y
Bey
. In the case of the flat tax, the tax is proportional, that is, αwy = 0. Wage
income after income and payroll taxes, denoted by W τy , is equal to:
W τy = wyHy −
∫
τwy dB
e
y − τ payy Bey, (2.8)
4I also assume Social Security and Medicare taxes share the same wage income base. The Social Security
tax rate is 6.2% with a cap at $ 118,500 for 2016, and is matched by the employer. There is an additional
0.9% to 1.25% Medicare tax when wages pass $ 200,000; these are not matched by the employer. See
https://www.irs.gov/taxtopics/tc751.html.
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where
∫
τwy dB
e
y = τ
prp
y B
e
y + 0.5α
w
y [B
e
y]
2 (2.9)
denote the amount of income tax collected. The average wage income tax in each income
bracket, τ¯y, is equal to
τ¯y =
∫
τwy dB
e
y
Bey
= τ prpy + 0.5α
w
y B
e
y. (2.10)
The proportional component, τ prpy , is indexed by income group to adjust the average tax
rate to the correct one for that particular group.
Savings Savings, Sy, buy an additional stream of future capital income that augments the
future consumption stream in the initial equilibrium, CFy (Ballard et al. 1985). The price of
savings is denoted by pS . Thus, pSSy is the value of savings, which equals the value of real
asset investment. The flow of capital services produced with each unit of savings invested
is denoted by κ (considered exogenous), which earns pκ per unit. Consequently, the return
of capital services from each unit of savings κ is pκκSy. This flow of capital income is
spent on future consumption which costs pCFy . That is,
pκκSy = pC
F
y . (2.11)
Equation 2.11 implies that pSSy = p
S
pκκ
pCFy . In other words, the value of savings equals
the present value of the increment in future consumption expenditures, where rS = p
κκ
pS
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denotes the real rate of return of those savings before taxes. Hence,
rSpSSy = pC
F
y . (2.12)
The capital income derived from savings is taxed at a rate τ r under the current income
tax system. Thus, the effective rate of return to savings is equal to [1 − αrτ r]rS , where
αr indicates whether the tax is applied or not. Under any of the reform proposals, cap-
ital income is not included in the individual tax base, so αr = 0. Therefore, the future
expenditure is financed with the after-tax return to investment,
[1− αrτ r]rSpSSy = [1 + τC ]pCFy . (2.13)
Thus, the present value of the investment in future consumption is such that
pSSy =
[1 + τC ]pCFy
[1− αrτ r]rS , (2.14)
Non-wage income
Unemployment insurance When individuals are unemployed, the government pro-
vides unemployment compensation which equals a fraction of their wage income, ρywyHy,
with ρy ∈ [0, 1] known as the replacement rate. This is the case of a replacement rate that
indexes unemployment benefits to wages.5 The replacement rate has a cap on the amount
of benefits delivered, however, to simplify the simulation process, I assume a replacement
rate that reflects the average ratio of unemployment benefits to wage income for each in-
come group. Under the current system, the income tax base for unemployment equilibrium
5See Pissarides (1998) for the case when unemployment benefits are fixed; that is, not indexed by wages.
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individuals is
Buy = ρywyHy − ωded. (2.15)
Thus the after-tax income from unemployment insurance is
P τy = ρywyHy −
∫
τwy dB
u
y . (2.16)
Payroll taxes are not assessed on unemployment benefits.
Other benefits and assets Individuals also receive transfers, My, such as Social Se-
curity benefits, a portion αM of which is financed with payroll taxes, which are taxed at a
rate τM . Neither of the reforms exempts individuals from this tax.
Capital gains and dividends individuals receive are taxed under the current income tax
system but not under any of the consumption tax reforms analyzed; any above-normal
returns are taxed only once under the business cash flow tax. Finally, individuals also have
an accumulated value of assets denoted by Ay, that yields the after-tax interest income
[1− αrτ r]rAy, where r denotes the interest rate.
Budget constraint
An employed individual’s intertemporal budget in steady state is equal to
[1 + τC ]pCPy + p
SSy = W
τ
y + Ωy.
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That is,
[1 + τC ]pCPy +
[1 + τC ]pCFy
[1− αrτ r]rS = W
τ
y + Ωy;
where
W τy = wyHy − [τ¯y + τ payy ]Bey, and (2.17)
Ωy = [1 + τ
M ]My + [1− αrτ r]rAy, (2.18)
denote the income after wage income and payroll taxes, and the after-tax income from
transfers and assets. Analogously, when the individual is unemployed, in the intertemporal
budget constraint, P τy replaces W
τ
y .
2.2.2 Firms’ Production, Earnings and Value
Production function
Let L =
∑
yNyHy denote the total number of hours available in the economy, and let
e denote the employment rate. Firms produce aggregate output Q using capital K and
employed labor eL as inputs in a CES production function,
Q =
[
[ψQ]
1
K1−
1
 + [1− ψQ] 1 [eL]1− 1
] 
−1
; (2.19)
where ψQ ∈ [0, 1] is the factor weighting parameter in the production function, and  > 0 is
the elasticity of substitution between employed labor and capital with respect to the before-
tax factor price ratio.
36
Earnings
As shown in equation 2.20 below, firm earnings before depreciation and corporate in-
come taxes, pi, are equal to the revenue from sales less labor costs, interest payments on
debt, and property taxes. Labor costs include wages paid to employees at an hourly wage
w¯ =
∑
yNywy/N , and employment taxes at rate τ
u, which include both unemployment
insurance and Social Security contributions.6 In addition, as described below, the model
includes the cost associated with posting job vacancies cvN , where c represents the average
cost to keep a vacancy open; and the number of vacancies vN is a fraction v of the popula-
tion. For simplicity, I do not include business purchases of goods, services, and materials
necessary to produceQ. The amount of debt,D, is assumed to be a fixed proportion, αD, of
the firm’s capital stock, so that D = αDK. Interest expense on this debt is rD. Firms also
pay property taxes, which tax rate is denoted by τ pro. Thus, earnings before depreciation
and taxes are:
pi = pQ− [1 + τu]w¯eL− cvN − τ proK − rD. (2.20)
The firm also invests amount I . The capital stock value increases with investment, and
declines over time due to depreciation, which occurs at rate δ ∈ [0, 1], such that
∆K = I − δK. (2.21)
6This includes the employer portion of social security taxes. Unemployment insurance for firms has a
salary cap, which I assume that is captured by the level of τu. I also assume τu includes the federal taxes and
an average of state unemployment insurance taxes.
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In steady state I = δK (there is no growth in the model), and the firm invests only the
fraction of its capital lost by depreciation. Because ∆K is zero in steady state and the debt
to capital ratio is constant, the issuance of new bonds in steady state is also zero.
The business income tax base, Bpi is defined as
Bpi = pQ− τ proK − [1 + τu]w¯eL− cvN − αkδτK − αII − αdrD; (2.22)
where δτ is depreciation for tax purposes and αk, αI , αd ∈ [0, 1] indicate whether an item
is included in the tax base. The current corporate income tax system taxes business profit
but includes some tax preferences or business tax expenditures, includes depreciation al-
lowances and interest expense deductions, and does not allow expensing of investment;
hence, αI = 0, αd = 1, and αk = 1. The flat tax and the X tax include expensing of
investment, and eliminate depreciation allowances and interest deductions, hence, αI = 1,
αd = 0, and αk = 0. The income tax, flat tax and the X tax all allow deductions for labor
expenses, with labor income expenses taxed at the individual level. Denoting the business
tax rate as τpi, after-tax earnings net of economic depreciation are
pi − τpiBpi − δK. (2.23)
Dividends, X , are assumed to be a constant fraction, αX ∈ [0, 1] of those earnings.
Firm’s value
New share issues are used to finance any investment that cannot be financed with debt or
with the firm’s net cash flow, that is, the difference between the after-tax earnings net of
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dividend payments, such that
pi − τpiBpi −X + Z = I. (2.24)
That is,
Z = I − [1− αX ][pi − τpiBpi]− αXδK. (2.25)
In other words, if cash flow is insufficient to pay dividends, the firm finances the gap by
selling new equity shares, collecting the amount Z > 0; if cash flow is large enough to
pay dividends, the firm buys shares, returning the extra cash to stock holders in the amount
Z < 0.
Let Π denote the value of the firm, τX the dividend tax rate, and τG the annual accrual
tax rate on capital gains, both taxed at the firm level; τG < τX to reflect the benefits of tax
deferral (due to taxation of capital gains only upon realization), and exemption when gains
are transferred at death, which is only partially offset by the taxation of inflationary gains,
especially in a relatively low inflation environment (Diamond and Zodrow 2005). None
of the tax reforms provide for taxation of dividends or capital gains. The individual level
no-arbitrage condition (Goulder and Summers 1989), requires
[1− αττ r]r = [1− α
xτX ]X + [1− αgτG][∆Π− Z]
Π
; (2.26)
using equation 2.26, the value of the firm in steady state is equal to:
Π = αv [αpi[pi − τpiBpi − δK] + δK − I] (2.27)
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where
αv =
1− αgτG
[1− αττ r]r (2.28)
αpi =
[
αX [1− αxτX ] + [1− αX ][1− αgτG]]
1− αgτG ; (2.29)
and αx and αg indicate whether dividends and capital gains are taxed, respectively. Under
the current income tax system αx = αg = 1, and under both consumption tax reforms,
αx = αg = 0.
2.2.3 Search-and-Matching Labor Market
Matching and Unemployment
The firms in the model announce vacancies to recruit candidates for job positions, to which
unemployed individuals apply. The labor market matches only a fraction of vacancies and
unemployed individuals due to labor market frictions.7The unemployment, job-vacancy,
and employment rates with respect to N are denoted u, v, and e = 1− u, respectively. The
quantity of individuals and vacancies matched, or employment inflow, is modeled using a
Cobb-Douglas (Pissarides 2000) matching function with constant returns to scale
m = µuβv1−β, (2.30)
where m is the fraction of the unemployed population that is matched to a job vacancy,
µ > 0 is the parameter that measures the efficiency of the market matching job applicants
and openings, and β ∈ [0, 1] is the elasticity of matches with respect to the unemployment
7The labor market is modeled following Pissarides (2000).
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rate.8 The matching efficiency parameter captures factors such as the availability of virtual
or physical spaces that facilitate labor exchange, or the compatibility between the skills
offered by individuals and the ones demanded by the firms. The parameter β represents the
sensitivity of the matching rate to the positive (and negative) externalities created by a rela-
tive increase in the number of firm vacancies or unemployed individuals. A larger number
of unemployed individuals implies less competition among firms in filling their vacan-
cies, but more competition among the unemployed. A large β enhances the positive effect
on firms, while it diminishes the negative effect on unemployed individuals. Similarly, a
larger number of vacancies implies less competition among unemployed individuals, but
more competition among firms. In that case, a large value of 1 − β enhances the positive
effect on unemployed individuals, and diminishes the negative effect on firms (Petronglo
and Pissarides 2001).
At the same time, employment outflow is affected by exogenous shocks that occur at a
fixed separation rate, λ; this assumption simplif ies the model, which focuses on the process
of job creation.9 As a result, the change in the number of employed people, ∆eN , is equal
to the difference between the employment inflow and outflow,
∆eN = mN − λeN ; (2.31)
in steady state, unemployment inflow and outflow are equal.
A common way to represent market congestion is market tightness, which is defined
from the firm perspective as ratio of the vacancy rate to the unemployment rate, which re-
8A matching function is a concave function that is continuous, non-negative, and increasing in both argu-
ments. It is usually assumed to be homogeneous of degree one, and such that m(u, 0) = m(0, v) = 0 (Pis-
sarides 2000). The Cobb-Douglas is the most popular function, and the parameters estimated from data are
consistent with the constant returns to scale functional form (Petronglo and Pissarides 2001).
9See Pissarides (2000) for endogenous separation rates as function of a drop in the job productivity below
a threshold determined by the firm, or by individuals’ on-the-job search.
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flects the congestion, or tightness that firms face when the number of job vacancies relative
to the number of unemployed workers increases. Market tightness, θ, is a function of the
inputs of the matching function, or
θ = vN/uN. (2.32)
Firms are said to face a tight labor market when the number of job vacancies is larger than
the number of unemployed workers, θ > 1. The matching function, expressed as a function
of market tightness, is
m = µθ−βv = µθ1−βu. (2.33)
Firms finds a suitable worker with a probability equal to the number of job matches to
the number of vacancies, mN/vN = µθ−β; similarly, workers are hired with probability
mN/uN = µθ1−β . An increase in market tightness reduces the firm’s probability of filling
a vacancy. Conversely, an increase in the labor market tightness increases individuals’
probability of being hired.10
The change in employment, ∆eN , expressed as a function of market tightness becomes,
µθ−β − λeN (Pissarides 2000). In steady state, the employment rate is a function of the
vacancy and separation rates, and labor market tightness:
e =
[
µθ−β
λ
]
v, (2.34)
10In the simulations, section 2.4, I do not restrict the probabilities to be lower than one; however, that is
not necessary since their respective simulated values are below that threshold.
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which shows the role of vacancies in job creation and employment. Furthermore, vacancies
can be expressed as a relationship between γ and unemployment
v =
[
[1− u]λ
µuβ
] 1
1−β
(2.35)
Equation 2.35 shows that after firms choose their optimal vacancy rate they still need to
face the job market to see how many of these vacancies will be left unfilled due to market
frictions.
Another way to examine the equilibrium is through the change in unemployment,
∆uN = λ[1− u]N − µθ1−βuN. (2.36)
In steady state, the unemployment inflow and outflow are the same, leading to an unem-
ployment rate equal to
u =
λ
λ+ µθ1−β
. (2.37)
This is the Beveridge equation (Pissarides 2000), which shows the relationship between
the unemployment rate, market tightness, and the employment separation rate.
Wage Bargaining
Within this context, firms and individuals optimize, with individuals choosing to be em-
ployed or unemployed and firms choosing to fill or leave unfilled their job vacancies. The
Bellman equations determine the value of being in each state as the sum of the current value
of being in that state and the discounted expected value in the next period. The expected
value is calculated using the separation rate, λ, the probability of filling a vacancy, µθ−β ,
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and probability of finding finding a job, µθ1−β . Assume a discount factor for workers and
firms equal to [1 + rτ ]−1. The steady state Bellman equations, which show the value of
being employed V ey or unemployed V
e
y (Boeters and Savard 2013), are:
V ey = U
e
y + [1 + r
τ ]−1[λV uy + [1− λ]V ey ], and (2.38)
V uy = U
u
y + [1 + r
τ ]−1[µθ1−βV ey + [1− µθ1−β]V uy ] (2.39)
Individuals keep working as long as V ey ≥ V uy . Individual indirect utility functions are de-
noted by U ey and U
u
y , under employment and unemployment states respectively. Similarly,
the values of a filled vacancy, V f , and an unfilled vacancy, V v, are:
V f = Πf + [1 + rτ ]−1[λV v + [1− λ]V f ], and (2.40)
V v = −c+ [1 + rτ ]−1[µθ−βV f + [1− µθ−β]V v] (2.41)
where Πf = ∂Π/∂eN denotes the marginal increase in the value of the firm due to an
additional employee.
The wage determination process has its origin in bargaining theory (Nash 1950; Bin-
more, Rubinstein, and Wolinsky 1986; Shaked and Sutton 1984). The idea behind wage
setting is that the labor exchange produces a surplus, and the wage set determines how the
surplus will be split between employees and firms. Labor market frictions create monop-
olistic power during the job matching (Pissarides 2000), allowing firms and individuals to
bargain for a larger share of surplus. The equilibrium wage, represented in the wage equa-
tion, maximizes the joint gains of firms and individuals extracted from their job agreement,
weighted by the respective power bargaining power of each group, which corresponds to
the Nash bargaining solution. In equilibrium the marginal benefits and losses, either to
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individuals and firms, from a change in wages are offset. The equilibrium wage rate has
the form:
w = arg max
w
[V ey − V u]σ[V f − V v]1−σ, (2.42)
where σ ∈ [0, 1] represents the worker’s bargaining power. Wages are denoted simply as
w under the assumption that firms are concerned only about aggregate wages and do not
distinguish the income group to which an individual belongs. Thus while an individual of
income group y bargains for wage wy, the firm bargains for w¯, both here represented by w.
The resulting set of bargaining wages is equal to {wy}∀y, and w¯ =
∑
yNywy/N .
Tax reforms affect the value of employment, which is reflected in wages, to different
degrees depending on the income group to which an individual belongs. In addition, wages
are also affected by unemployment insurance, which affects the cost of unemployment.
2.2.4 Government’s Budget
Finally, the government is assumed to be subject to a balanced budget constraint, and each
one of the reforms are revenue-neutral according to this budget. There are two different
levels:
• The amount collected from payroll taxes and firm’s contributions should cover ex-
penses on transfers and unemployment benefits, such that:
∑
y
eNyτ
payBey + τ
uw¯eL =
∑
y
Nyα
MMy +
∑
y
uNyρywyHy. (2.43)
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• The rest of the government expenses, pG, equals the rest of its revenue:
pG =
∑
y
Ny
[
τCp
[
eCPey + uC
Pu
y
]
+
τCp
[1− αrτ r]rS
[
eCFey + uC
Fu
y
]]
+
∑
y
Nyα
rτ rrSpS
[
eSey + uS
u
y
]
+
∑
y
Ny
[
αrτ rrAy + τ
MMy
]
+
∑
y
Ny τ¯y
[
eBey + uB
u
y
]
−
∑
y
Ny[1− αM ]My
+ τpiBpi + τ proK + αxτXX + αgτG[−Z] (2.44)
2.3 General Equilibrium
The derivation of the general equilibrium equations is detailed in the Appendix A.
2.3.1 Individuals and Firms
Individuals
Employed Individuals maximize their utility given their budget constraints. Thus, indi-
vidual choices regarding consumption, savings, and labor hours depend on employment
status. I denote the optimal consumption, savings, and hours supplied when the individual
is employed as CPey , C
Fe
y , S
e
y and H
e
y , respectively. The system of equations that solves
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the individual’s maximization problem is
CPey = α
ψ
W τy (H
e
y) + Ωy
[1 + τC ]p
(2.45)
CFey = [1− αψ]
[1− αrτ r]rS[W τy (Hey) + Ωy]
[1 + τC ]p
(2.46)
Sey =
rS
pκκ
[1− αψ][W τy (Hey) + Ωy] (2.47)
Hey =
[
W τy (H
e
y) + Ωy
[1 + τC ]p
] γ
η
[
ψC
αψ
] γ[1+η]
η[ξ−1]
[
[1− τwy (Hey)− τ payy ]wy
ψHy [1 + τ
C ]p
]γ
; (2.48)
where
αψ =
ψC
ψC + [1− ψC ] [[1− αrτ r]rS]ξ−1 , (2.49)
represents the share of income used in present consumption, expressed in terms of individ-
ual preference parameters, opportunity costs, and the proportion of tax on savings.
I also calculate the uncompensated wage and income elasticities of labor supply and
the wage elasticity of consumption, used in the wage equation. The uncompensated wage
elasticity of labor supply, ΘHw, is equal to
ΘHw =
γ
[
1− αwy wyHey
1−τwy −τ payy
]
+ γ
η
[
[1−τwy −τ payy ]wyHey
W τy +Ωy
]
1 + γ
[
αwy wyH
e
y
1−τwy −τ payy
]
− γ
η
[
[1−τwy −τ payy ]wyHey
W τy +Ωy
] . (2.50)
The income elasticity of labor supply, ΘHΩ, is equal to
ΘHΩ =
γ
η
[
Ω
W τy +Ωy
]
1 + γ
[
αwwyHey
1−τwy −τ payy
]
− γ
η
[
[1−τwy −τ payy ]wyHey
W τy +Ωy
] , (2.51)
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and the wage elasticity of consumption, ΘCw, is
ΘCw =
[1− τwy − τ payy ]wyHey
W τy + Ωy
[1 + ΘHw] . (2.52)
Unemployed Analogously, unemployed individuals’ present consumption, CPuy , future
consumption, CFuy , and savings, S
u
y , are
CPuy = α
ψ
P τy + Ωy
[1 + τC ]p
(2.53)
CFuy = [1− αψ]
[1− αrτ r]rS[P τy + Ωy]
[1 + τC ]p
(2.54)
Suy =
rS
pκκ
[1− αψ][P τy + Ωy]. (2.55)
Firms
Firms choose their optimal vacancy rate and stock of capital to maximize their value. The
optimal vacancy rate and thus the level employment are determined in the labor market
equilibrium. The optimal capital stock is
K =
ψQeL
[1− ψQ]N
[
φK + δφI
φL
]−
(2.56)
where
φI =
1
1− τpi
[
1
αpi
− τpi[αI + αk]
]
, (2.57)
φK =
1
1− τpi
[
[1− αdτpi]rαD + δ − δ
αpi
]
+ τ pro, and (2.58)
φL =
λ
µθ−β
cN
L
+ [1 + τu]w¯. (2.59)
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represent after-tax marginal costs of capital and labor respectively. Additionally, total out-
put value yield
Q =
eL
1− ψQ
[
1− ψQ
1− αQ
] 
−1
(2.60)
where
αQ =
ψQ[φK + δφI ]1−
ψQ[φK + δφI ]1− + [1− ψQ][φL]1− . (2.61)
Market clearing
The market clearing condition states that in each sector the sum of goods consumed must
be the same as the ones produced, or
∑
y
Ny
[
e[CPey + C
Fe
y ] + u[C
Pu
y + C
Fu
y ]
]
+G+
∑
y
Ny[1− αM ]My = Q (2.62)
Equation 2.62, along with the government budget determine the equilibrium values of
prices and the interest rate, which depends on the labor market variables, wages and market
tightness.
2.3.2 Job Creation and Wage Determination
The marginal increase in the value of the firm due to an increase of employed individuals
is equal to:
Πf =αvαpi[1− τpi]
[
p
∂Q
∂eN
− [1 + τu]w¯ L
N
]
, (2.63)
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where
∂Q
∂eN
=
[
1− αQ
1− ψQ
] 1
1− L
N
(2.64)
Equation 2.63 shows the firm’s mark-up obtained from a filled vacancy, that is, the dif-
ference between labor’s marginal profit and wage-compensation costs, after-taxes. An in-
crease in wages reduces the mark-up directly by increasing costs of workers’ compensation,
and indirectly by reducing its marginal profit. In a competitive labor market the mark-up
equals zero; however, in a search-and-matching framework, the mark-up must be positive,
and large enough to cover the costs of recruiting job candidates (as explained in the follow-
ing section).
Free-entry Condition and Job Creation Equation
Solving the system of Bellman equations (equations 2.38, 2.39, 2.40, and 2.41) leads to
V ey =
1 + rτ
rτ
[
[rτ + µθ1−β]U ey + λU
u
y
rτ + µθ1−β + λ
]
, (2.65)
V uy =
1 + rτ
rτ
[
µθ1−βU ey + [r
τ + λ]Uuy
rτ + µθ1−β + λ
]
, (2.66)
V f =
1 + rτ
rτ
[
[rτ + µθ−β]Πf − λc
rτ + µθ−β + λ
]
, and (2.67)
V v =
1 + rτ
rτ
[
µθ−βΠf − [rτ + λ]c
rτ + µθ−β + λ
]
. (2.68)
Note that if an open vacancy can produce a positive return, V v > 0, more firms will
participate in the labor market until profit is reduced to zero; the case when V v < 0 is
analogous. Thus, in equilibrium V v = 0, which is known as the free entry condition.
This restriction leads to an equilibrium between the firm’s mark-up obtained from a filled
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vacancy, Πf , and the capitalized costs incurred when it fails to find a match, balancing the
gains and losses from posting a vacancy. Such equilibrium is also known as the job creation
equation,
Πf =
[rτ + λ]c
µθ−β
. (2.69)
After replacing Πf with equation 2.63, it becomes
αpi[1− τpi]
[
p
[
1− αQ(θ)
1− ψQ
] 1
1−
− [1 + τu]w¯
]
L
N
=
[rτ + λ]c
µθ−β
. (2.70)
Vacancies are analogous to an investment project that yields positive returns or losses, and
that the optimal vacancy rate maximizes its net expected return (Pissarides 2010). The free-
entry equilibrium of benefits and costs of equation 2.70 shows how the costs of opening
a vacancy increase with a larger market tightness, as firms take more time to find a good
match, which increases recruiting costs. The job creation equation also shows how the
marginal value of a filled vacancy declines when the marginal labor cost increases, for ex-
ample, due to an increase in market tightness or wages, or when the marginal cost of capital
decreases, which makes capital investment more attractive. The job and Beveridge equa-
tions determine the market tightness, and the unemployment and vacancy rates in terms of
wages, prices and the interest rate.
Wage Determination
From the the first order condition of equation 2.42, we obtain the wage equation:
[1− σ] [U ey − Uuy ] = σ [ ∂U ey/∂wy−∂Πf/∂w¯
] [
Πf + c
]
, (2.71)
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which can also be expressed as the surplus needed in the wage agreement to change from
an unemployed to an employed status
U ey = U
u
y +
σ
1− σ
[
∂U ey/∂wy
−∂Πf/∂w¯
] [
Πf + c
]
(2.72)
or, from the firm perspective, the one needed to fill the vacancy instead of leave it open,
Πf = −c+ 1− σ
σ
[−∂Πf/∂w¯
∂U ey/∂wy
] [
U ey − Uuy
]
(2.73)
Equation 2.74, the marginal utility of employment with respect to wages, expressed in terms
of consumption when the individual is employed and hours of labor, and wage elasticities
of labor and consumption is
∂U ey
∂wy
=
1
wy
[
[Cey ]
1+ 1
ηΘC,w − ψH [Hey ]1+
1
γ ΘH,w
]
, (2.74)
and the marginal change in rents due to changes in wages, using the values of αQ and φL is
∂Πf
∂w¯
= αpi[1− τpi][1 + τu] L
N
[
p
[
1− αQ
1− ψQ
] 1
1− αQ
φL
− 1
]
. (2.75)
2.3.3 Equilibrium
In summary, the equilibrium system is comprised of the Beveridge equation (2.37) (BE), the
individual labor supply equation (2.48) (LS), the market clearing condition (2.62) (MC),
the government balanced budget (A.78) (GB), the job creation equation (2.70) (JC), and
the wage equation (2.71) (WE). The general equilibrium system can be solved for the tuple
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(wy, H
e
y , r, θ); that is:
BE : λ[1− u]− µθ1−βu = 0 (2.76)
LS : Hey −
[
W τy + Ωy
[1 + τC ]p
] γ
η
[
ψC
αψ
] γ[1+η]
η[ξ−1]
[
[1− τwy − τ payy ]wy
ψHy [1 + τ
C ]p
]γ
= 0; (2.77)
MC :
∑
y
Ny
[
e[CPey + C
Fe
y ] + u[C
Pu
y + C
Fu
y ]
]
+ pG+
∑
y
Ny[1− αM ]My −Q = 0 (2.78)
GB :
∑
y
Ny
[
τCp
[
eCPey + uC
Pu
y
]
+
τCp
[
eCFey + uC
Fu
y
]
[1− αrτ r]rS
]
+
∑
y
Nyα
rτ rrSpS
[
eSey + uS
u
y
]
+
∑
y
Ny
[
αrτ rrAy + τ
MMy
]
+
∑
y
Ny τ¯
[
eBey + uB
u
y
]
−
∑
y
Ny[1− αM ]My
+ τpiBpi + τ proK + αxτXX + αgτG[−Z]− pG = 0 (2.79)
JC : αvαpi[1− τpi] L
N
[
p
[
1− αQ
1− ψQ
] 1
1−
− [1 + τu]w¯
]
− [r
τ + λ]c
µθ−β
= 0 (2.80)
WE : σ
∂U ey
∂wy
[
Πf + c
]
+ [1− σ]∂Π
f
∂w¯
[
U ey − Uuy
]
= 0 (2.81)
BE and JC can both be expressed in terms of u and v and determine the equilibrium un-
employment and vacancy rates, u(wy, p, r) and v(wy, p, r), as well as market tightness
θ(wy, p, r) and the employment rate, e(wy, p, r). Substituting into MC, GB and WE yields
a system of three equations and three unknown variables wy(p, r), p(wy, r), and r(wy, p).
Finally, the equilibrium is complete when these conditions are satisfied for each cohort y,
which yields all the firm-related variables dependent of w¯.
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2.4 Simulations
2.4.1 Calibration
I use data from Statistics of Income by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) (Internal Rev-
enue Service 2013), and seasonally adjusted U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) data
(U.S. Department of Labor 2015d; U.S. Department of Labor 2015c; U.S. Department of
Labor 2015b; U.S. Department of Labor 2015a) for the estimation of income and con-
sumption variables and the calibration of parameters. I assume a working population of
N = 145, 238, 285, which is the total number of returns filled with the IRS in 2013. N
is normalized to Nˆ = 1. I also use Adjusted Gross Income (AGI) is used to divide the
population into income groups and measure other variables, including wages and salaries,
unemployment compensation, taxable income, interest income, marginal income tax, or
Social Security benefits for each income group using a polynomial fit. Additionally, the
level of Social Security benefits is adjusted to clear the goods market in the benchmark
equilibrium. The benchmark equilibrium marginal income tax schedule is estimated using
a weighted average of single, married and household marginal income tax schedules. I also
choose pκκ = rS = r (thus, also pS = 1), and τ pay = τu, to have employment and payroll
taxes equally shared between the employee and the employer. All prices are expressed in
real terms at 2013 prices.
Beveridge and Wage Equations
I use the elasticity of matches to the unemployment rate β = 0.5 (Pissarides 1998) which
is also within the range of estimates for the U.S. (Blanchard and Diamond 1989). At the
benchmark equilibrium, the calibrated separation rate is approximately λ = 3%, and the
matching efficiency, µ = 0.67. The calibrated separation rate is consistent with the es-
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Table 2.1 : Benchmark assumptions.
Variables & Parameters Notation Value Sources
Unemployment rate u 0.06 BLS (2015c)
Vacancy rate v 0.03 BLS (2015c)
Interest Rate r 0.37
Average wage rate w¯ 1
Elasticity of matches to β 0.5 Blanchard and Diamond (1989)
unemployment rate
Population Nˆ 1
Intertemporal elasticity ξ 0.25 Altig et al (2001)
of substitution
Elasticity of substitution in production  0.8 Altig et al (2001)
Production function capital share ψQ 0.25 Altig et al (2001)
Depreciation rate δ 0.08 Zodrow and Diamond (2013)
Depreciation rate for tax purposes δτ 0.11 Zodrow and Diamond (2013)
Ratio debt-to-capital αD 0.3 Damodaran (2015)
Zodrow and Diamond (2013)
Divident payout ratio αX 0.6 Damodaran (2015)
Zodrow and Diamond (2013)
Unemployment insurance ρ1, ρ2, ρ3 0.79, 0.65, 0.49 IRS (2013)
ρ4, ρ5, ρ6 0.37, 0.28, 0.21
ρ7, ρ8, ρ9 0.17, 0.13, 0.1
ρ10, ρ11, ρ12 0.07, 0.06, 0.02
Average tax on interest income τ r 0.18 IRS (2013)
Average employment/payroll tax τu, τ pay 0.08 IRS (2013)
Tax on interest income τ rA 0.027 IRS (2013)
from assets
Tax on Social Security benefits τM 0.2 IRS (2013)
Dividends tax τX 0.24 CBO (2014)
Capital gains tax τG 0.15 CBO (2014)
Property tax τ pro 0.02 Zodrow and Diamond (2013)
timates of Shimer (2005, 2012); and is somewhat lower than the 2001-2015 average of
3.4% (U.S. Department of Labor 2015d) which includes the effects of the 2008 economic
downturn. The separation rate and matching efficiency are calibrated to obtain an unem-
ployment rate, u = 6%, which reflects the 1947-2015 average (U.S. Department of Labor
2015c). The vacancy rate is set to the 2001-2015 average, v = 3% (U.S. Department of
Labor 2015d). Both unemployment and vacancy rate values imply an estimated probability
of finding a job of m/u = 48%, consistent with Shimer (2012). Furthermore, the resulting
probability of filling a vacancy, m/v = 95% is consistent with Shimer (2005). The corre-
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Table 2.2 : Benchmark calibrated variables.
Parameter Notation Value
Utility consumption share ψC 0.91
Utility labor share ψH 0.41
Intensity of consumption effects η -1.55
Intensity of labor supply effects γ 0.25
Average cost per opened vacancy c 0.4
Separation rate λ 0.03
Matching efficiency µ 0.67
Individual’s bargaining power σ1, σ2, σ3 0.01,0.07,0.21
σ4, σ5, σ6 0.35, 0.49,0.58
σ7, σ8, σ9 0.67, 0.74, 0.79
σ10, σ11, σ12 0.86,0.90,0.97
Percentage of Social Sec. funded by Payroll tax αM 0.75
Government discretionary expenses G 0.34
sponding matching rate, m = 2.9%, also approximates the 2001-2015 average, 3.4% (U.S.
Department of Labor 2015d).
Bargaining power parameters, σy, are estimated from the wage equation in the bench-
mark equilibrium. Their values ranges between 1 to 97 percent from the lowest to the
highest income group. The average of all income groups is 0.56, close to the standard
assumption of 0.5 in models that use a single representative individual (Pissarides 2000).
2.4.2 Individual Labor Supply
I assume that the individual labor supply averages eight hours a day (U.S. Department of
Labor 2015b); that is, Hˆe = 2080 hours per year per individual. Prices are set equal to one,
that is p = pS = 1. The elasticity of substitution of intertemporal consumption, ξ = 0.25 is
set equal to its value in Altig et al. (2001), and falls in the range used in other CGE models.
The utility consumption share, ψC = 0.91, and labor share, ψH = 0.41, are calibrated
using the individual labor supply function, setting the average wage rate w¯ = 1 and the
value of αψ = 0.56 at the benchmark equilibrium.
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Table 2.3 : Policy variables.
Variables Notation Benchmark X Flat
Percentage of tax for non-exempted goods αC 1 1 1
Interest tax inclusion αr 1 0 0
Interest expense deducted tax inclusion αd 1 0 0
Depreciation allowances inclusion αk 1 0 0
Investment expensed deduction αI 0 1 1
Dividend tax inclusion αx 1 0 0
Capital gains inclusion αg 1 0 0
The intensity of consumption effects, η = −1.55, and intensity of labor supply effects,
γ = 0.25, were calibrated by setting the average uncompensated wage elasticity of labor
supply ΘH,w = 0.1 and the average income elasticity of labor supply ΘH,Ω = −0.05, values
which are close to recent empirical estimates (McClelland and Mok 2012).
Job Creation Equation
At the benchmark equilibrium Lˆ =
∑
y NˆyH
e
y/Hˆ
e = 1, and w¯ = 1. The production func-
tion capital share is set to ψQ = 0.25 (Altig et al. 2001), and the elasticity of substitution
of capital to  = 0.8. I use the optimal capital stock equation (equation 2.56) and the job
creation equation (equation 2.70) to calibrate the average cost per open vacancy to c = 0.4.
Government
The percentage of Social Security funded with payroll taxes, αM = 0.75, is calibrated using
equation 2.43, and government discretionary expenses G = 0.34 are calibrated such that
equation A.78 is balanced. Table 2.3 shows the values of the α parameters that determine
whether and the extent to which certain components are included in the tax base.
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Table 2.4 : Aggregate Effects
Variables Notation Benchmark X Flat
Unemployment rate u 6.00% 3.11% 3.88%
Vacancy rate v 3.00% 6.12% 4.85%
Market tightness θ 0.50 1.96 1.25
Interest rate r 0.37 0.29 0.31
Production Q 1.42 1.51 1.38
Capital K 0.53 0.32 0.48
Labor supply L 1.00 0.97 0.95
Average wage w¯ 1.00 1.02 0.98
Effective labor demand eL 0.93 0.99 0.91
Marginal labor cost φL 1.09 1.13 1.08
Marginal capital cost φK 0.16 0.72 0.23
Marginal investment cost phiI 1.10 1.00 1.00
Rents from a filled vacancy Πf 0.14 0.27 0.23
Labor productivity ∂Q/∂eN 1.17 1.21 1.11
Marginal change in rents a from filled vacancy ∂Πf/∂w¯ -1.39 -1.63 -1.69
due to changes in the average wage
2.4.3 Results
2.4.4 Aggregate variables
Labor market Both, the flat tax and the X-tax reforms, result in significant reductions in
unemployment (table 2.4). This is caused by an important increase in market tightness (θ =
v/u) in both cases; from 0.5 to 1.25 with the flat tax, and to almost 2 with the X-tax (table
2.4). The increase in market tightness, depicted in figure 2.1, is reflected as a steeper slope
of the job creation curve. Given that the X-tax reform leads to the largest market tightness,
it also increases the probability of being hired more than the flat tax. The probability of
being hired increases from 48 to 94 percent under the X-tax reform, compared to the (also
high) increase to 75 percent probability under the flat tax. Consequently, the unemployment
rate is lower under the X-tax, 3.1% percent, than under the flat tax, 3.9%. The probability of
filling a vacancy falls from 95 to 48 and 60 percent with the flat tax and X-tax, respectively.
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Figure 2.1 : Beveridge and Job Creation Curves
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Given that the probability of filling a vacancy falls, it takes longer to fill the vacancy with a
match. Thus, it becomes more expensive to keep a vacancy open under both reforms.
The increases in market tightness under both reforms and the corresponding reductions
in unemployment are explained by a relative reduction in the cost of labor compared with
the rents obtained from a filled vacancy. Both reforms raise the marginal loss in rents from
a filled vacancy due to an increase in the average wage (∂Πf/∂w¯). In the case of the X-tax
∂Πf/∂w¯ increases by 17 percent, while under the flat tax it increases by 21 percent (table
2.4). Hence, it becomes more expensive to raise wages under the X-tax or flat tax compared
with the benchmark equilibrium. As a result, there is an increase in the incentive to reduce
wages from the firm’s side. This effect is represented by downward shifts of the wage
curves under both reforms in figure 2.2. There is also an opposite effect, which increases
(for almost all income groups) their incentive to bargain for higher wages, as explained in
section concerning individuals’ effects. However, the downward effect due to the increase
in the average wage prevails.
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Figure 2.2 : Job Creation and Wage curves.
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Additionally, the rents from a vacancy filled (ΠF ) increase in both cases, from 0.14 to
0.27 under the X-tax, and to 0.23 under the flat tax. It shows that benefits of the reduction
in wage costs (flat tax) or increased labor productivity (X-tax) exceeds the cost of opening
more vacancies. The marginal labor cost, φL, reduces by 1 percent with the flat tax but
increases almost 4 percent with the X-tax. The increase in marginal labor costs with the
X-tax is offset with an increase the labor productivity of approximately 3 percent. This is
partially due to shifting from capital towards labor given the increase in the cost of capital
Table 2.5 : Taxes.
Variables Notation Benchmark X Flat
Average income tax τ¯1, τ¯2, τ¯3 0.10, 0.10, 0.10 0.10, 0.10, 0.10 0.31
τ¯4, τ¯5, τ¯6, 0.10, 0.10, 0.11 0.10, 0.10, 0.11
τ¯7, τ¯8, τ¯9 0.12, 0.13, 0.15 0.12, 0.13, 0.15
τ¯10, τ¯11, τ¯12 0.17, 0.19, 0.33 0.17, 0.19, 0.34
Marginal income tax τw1 , τ
w
2 , τ
w
3 0.10, 0.10, 0.10 0.10, 0.10, 0.10 0.31
τw4 , τ
w
5 , τ
w
6 0.13, 0.15, 0.15 0.13, 0.15, 0.15
τw7 , τ
w
8 , τ
w
9 0.18, 0.21, 0.21 0.19, 0.22, 0.22
τw10, τ
w
11, τ
w
12 0.26, 0.27, 0.38 0.27, 0.28, 0.40
Sales τ con 0.08 0 0
Business income tax τpi 0.35 0.40 0.31
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Figure 2.3 : Labor supply, and changes in labor supply (level).
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stock, φK (table 2.4). Also, the increased cost of filling a vacancy (it takes longer to fill
it with a match) is balanced with lower interest rates in both reforms, which reduce the
cost of investing in those vacancies (right-hand side of equation 2.70). Figure 2.2 shows
the upward shifts of the X-tax and flat tax job creation curves. This effect pushes wages
up, compensating for the downward effect that occurs under the wage equation. In the
end, the downward effect on wages dominates under the flat tax, in which case the average
wage falls by 2 percent, while the upward effect dominates under the X-tax, increasing the
average wage, also by 2 percent.
A standard result under a consumption tax reform is the substitution effect of the wage
change on the choice between consumption and leisure, which in principle could reduce the
incentive to work. Aggregate labor supply falls 3 percent under the X-tax, while it drops
5 percent with the flat tax. This is due in part to maintaining the same average income tax
under the X-tax, but increasing the average income tax rate for most of the income groups
with the flat tax.
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Output and capital One of the advantages of a consumption tax is its positive effect on
output and capital accumulation (Altig et al. 2001). Capital stock falls from 0.53 to 0.32
under the X-tax, and to 0.48 with the flat tax, respectively. Part of this reduction is due
to an increase in the after-tax marginal cost of capital under both reforms, which exceeds
the benefits obtained from investment expensing. That is, while φI falls from 1.10 to 1 in
both reforms, φK raises from 0.16 to 0.23 under the flat tax, and to 0.72 under the X-tax
(table 2.4). In the case of the X-tax, the business tax rate increases to match the income
tax rate applied to the highest income group (table 2.5). Combined with the broadening
of the business tax base –by the elimination of interest expenses deductions– reduces the
capital stock by a significant amount. In the case of the flat tax, the lower business tax
rate compensates the negative effect on the capital stock, thus reducing it in a much lower
magnitude. Additionally, in this model, firms not only invest in capital (K) but also in
effective labor through the number of vacancies opened. Thus, more vacancies lead to less
capital invested, as is shown in table 2.4. This result is different from those obtained in the
standard CGE literature. Output increases under the X-tax (table 2.4) due to an increase
in the effective labor demand, eL. However, it decreases under the flat-tax given that the
average tax rate increases for almost all income groups, thus reducing the aggregate demand
for goods.
Individuals
Hours, wages, savings and consumption by income group The flat tax increases the
average tax rate to 31 percent for all the income groups except the top one. In contrast, the
X-tax average income tax is kept roughly the same as in the benchmark equilibrium (table
2.5), which plays a significant role in the different responses of individual labor supply of
the various income groups. In an X-tax reform, almost all income groups (except the first
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Figure 2.4 : Wages, changes in level (left) and percentages (right).
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Figure 2.5 : Marginal utility from wage rate and changes in level.
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two) change their hours of work slightly (figure 2.3). By comparison, the flat tax has a
marked reduction for the first seven income groups, and increase for the last three.
For both reforms, the changes in hours of work follow a similar pattern to proportional
changes in the wage rate (figure 2.4). In the case of the X-tax, the marginal utility obtained
from a change in the wage rate (∂U ey/∂wy) is, on average, kept almost the same with respect
to the benchmark equilibrium (figure 2.5). However, ∂U ey/∂wy reduces for the first two
income groups, and increases for income groups 3 and 4. Also, the individual rents obtained
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Figure 2.6 : Individual rents from wage agreement, change in levels (left) and percentages
(right).
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from wage agreement (U ey − Uuy ) increase for almost all income groups (figure 2.6). Thus,
given the growth of individual rents from wage agreement, there are incentives to bargain
for higher wages. However, the incentive to reduce wages by the firms counters the increase
of individual rents. Therefore, there is only a small raise of wages for those income groups
that increased their individual rents and had large enough bargaining power.
On the other hand, the flat tax decreases the marginal utility from wages for income
groups 1 to 9, thus reducing their incentive to bargain for a higher wage. However, their in-
dividual rents from wage agreement also reduce, which has the opposite effect of increasing
their incentive to bargain. The combined result leads to a raise in wages for income groups
10 to 12, and almost no change for groups 8 and 9. This result is also reflected in their
hours of work.
Present consumption falls under the flat tax, on average, except for income groups 10 to
12 who increase their consumption. In the case of the X-tax, present consumption increases
except for income groups 1 to 3. Savings are affected almost equally among income groups
under the X-tax, about 25 percent on average, except for the lowest income decile. Under
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Figure 2.7 : Changes in percentages of present consumption (left) and savings (right).
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the flat tax, savings fall by 30 on average for income groups 1 to 5, 27 percent for income
group 6, and by 20 percent on average for income groups 7 to 12. The main reason behind
the decline in savings under both reforms is the interest rate reduction.
Incidence Figure 2.8 shows the incidence of tax reforms measured by their amount of
equivalent variation. On average, both reforms have some negative impact on the welfare
of the income groups. The X-tax reform is slightly more neutral to income groups 1 to 7
when the individuals are employed, and 1 to 5 when they are unemployed.
In contrast, the flat tax is more neutral to income groups 10 and 11 when they are
employed, and 6 to 11 when they are unemployed. The top 2 percent either enjoys the
largest benefit with the flat tax, or the suffers the highest loss with the X-tax. Between both
reforms, the X-tax is less regressive.
2.5 Conclusions
I simulated the effects of the enactment of a Hall-Rabushka flat tax and the Bradford X-
tax. I found that replacing the current progressive income tax system either with an X tax
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Figure 2.8 : Index of equivalent variation when employed (left), and unemployed (right).
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Figure 2.9 : Wage elasticities of labor supply and changes.
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or a flat tax reform lead to a decrease in unemployment. Both reforms reduce the cost of
labor and encourage firms to increase the number of vacancies. Hence, the market tightness
increases and the unemployment rate drops. Output and labor supply remain practically the
same, while capital falls from its levels from the benchmark equilibrium with both reforms.
Both reforms reduce the welfare of most income groups. However, the enactment of a
flat tax, which reduces the degree of tax progressivity compared with the X tax, affects dis-
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Figure 2.10 : Consumption elasticities of labor supply and changes.
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proportionately the wage of lower income groups, which affects their consumption levels.
Measured by its equivalent variation, the flat tax reform is more regressive than the X-tax.
These simulations show how increases in growth, capital accumulation and economic
efficiency that typically occur under standard CGE analyses could be reduced, while the
efficiency in the labor market is increased through unemployment reduction.
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Appendix A
A.1 General Equilibrium
A.1.1 Goods Market
Individuals
Employed Individuals I denote the Lagrangian function as L, and the Lagrange multi-
plier as χ. In the case the individual is employed, it is defined as
L = [Cy]
1+ 1
η
1 + 1
η
− ψH [Hy]
1+ 1
γ
1 + 1
γ
+ χ
[
W τy + Ωy − Ey
]
(A.1)
where
Cy =
[
[ψC ]
1
ξ [CPy ]
ξ−1
ξ + [1− ψC ] 1ξ [CFy ]
ξ−1
ξ
] ξ
ξ−1
, (A.2)
W τy = wyHy − [τ¯y + τ payy ]Bey, (A.3)
Bey = wyHy − ωded, (A.4)
Ωy = [1− τM ]My + [1− αrτ r]rAy, (A.5)
Ey = [1 + τ
C ]pCPy +
[1 + τC ]pCFy
[1− αrτ r]rS . (A.6)
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The optimal values for individual labor supply and present and future consumption are
denoted by Hey , C
Pe
y , and C
Fe
y , respectively. The first order conditions are
∂L
∂CPy
= [Cy(C
Pe
y , C
Fe
y )]
1
η
∂Cy
∂CPy
(CPey , C
Fe
y )− χ[1 + τC ]p = 0 (A.7)
∂L
∂CFy
= [Cy(C
Pe
y , C
Fe
y )]
1
η
∂Cy
∂CFy
(CPey , C
Fe
y )− χ
[1 + τC ]p
[1− αrτ r]rS = 0 (A.8)
∂L
∂Hy
= −ψHy [Hey ]
1
γ + χ[1− τwy (Hey)− τ payy ]wy = 0 (A.9)
∂L
∂χ
= W τy (H
e
y) + Ωy − Ey(CPey , CFey ) = 0 (A.10)
Consumption Dividing (A.7) by (A.8) yields
[
ψCCFey
[1− ψC ]CPey
] 1
ξ
= [1− αrτ r]rS.
That is,
CFey
CPey
=
[
[1− αrτ r]rS]ξ [1− ψC
ψC
]
. (A.11)
Plugging equation A.11 into the expenditures equation, A.6, leads to
Ey(C
Pe
y , C
Fe
y ) = [1 + τ
C ]pCPey +
[1 + τC ]p
[1− αrτ ry ]rS
[
[1− αrτ r]rS]ξ [1− ψC
ψC
]
CPey
=
[1 + τC ]pCPey
αψ
, (A.12)
where
αψ =
ψC
ψC + [1− ψC ]
[
1
[1−αrτry ]rS
]1−ξ . (A.13)
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Using equation A.12 in the budget constraint, equation A.10, I obtain
CPey = α
ψ
W τy + Ωy
[1 + τC ]p
. (A.14)
Equation A.14 along with equation A.11 lead to
CFey = [1− αψ]
[1− αrτ r]rS[W τy + Ωy]
[1 + τC ]p
(A.15)
Thus, the optimal consumption utility function, Cey = Cy(C
Pe
y , C
Fe
y ), is
Cey =
[ψC ] 1ξ [αψ[W τy + Ωy]
[1 + τC ]p
] ξ−1
ξ
+ [1− ψC ] 1ξ
[
[1− αψ][W τy + Ωy]
[1+τC ]p
[1−αrτr]rS
] ξ−1
ξ

ξ
ξ−1
=
W τy + Ωy
[1 + τC ]p
[
[ψC ]
1
ξ
[
αψ
] ξ−1
ξ + [1− ψC ] 1ξ [[1− αrτ r]rS[1− αψ]] ξ−1ξ ] ξξ−1.
Using the value of αψ, equation A.13, it becomes
Cey =
W τy + Ωy
[1 + τC ]p
[ψC ] 1ξ [ ψC
ψC + [1− ψC ] [[1− αrτ r]rS]ξ−1
] ξ−1
ξ
+[1− ψC ] 1ξ
[
[1− αrτ ry ]rS
[1− ψC ] [[1− αrτ r]rS]ξ−1
ψC + [1− ψC ] [[1− αrτ r]rS]ξ−1
] ξ−1
ξ

ξ
ξ−1
,
=
W τy + Ωy
[1 + τC ]p
 ψC + [1− ψC ]
[
[1− αrτ r]rS]ξ−1[
ψC + [1− ψC ] [[1− αrτ r]rS]ξ−1
] ξ−1
ξ

ξ
ξ−1
,
=
W τy + Ωy
[1 + τC ]p
[
ψC + [1− ψC ] [[1− αrτ r]rS]ξ−1] 1ξ−1 .
(A.16)
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That is,
Cey =
W τy (H
e
y) + Ωy
[1 + τC ]p
[
αψ
ψC
] 1
1−ξ
. (A.17)
Savings Since
pSSey =
[1 + τC ]pCFey
[1− αrτ r]rS ,
by replacing the future consumption equation, A.15, individual savings are equal to
Sey =
[1− αψ][W τy + Ωy]
pS
=
[
rS
pκκ
]
[1− αψ][W τy + Ωy]. (A.18)
Individual labor supply To obtain the individual labor supply function, Hey , I first
divide (A.7) by (A.9), such that
[Cey ]
1
η
∂Cy
∂CPy
(CPey , C
Fe
y )
ψHy [H
e
y ]
1
γ
=
[1 + τC ]p
[1− τwy (Hey)− τ payy ]wy
. (A.19)
Rearranging the terms, the individual labor supply function is equal to
ψHy [H
e
y ]
1
γ =
[Cey ]
1
η
∂Cy
∂CPy
[1− τwy (Hey)− τ payy ]wy
[1 + τC ]p
, or
Hey =
 [Cey ] 1η ∂Cy∂CPy [1− τwy (Hey)− τ payy ]wy
ψHy [1 + τ
C ]p
γ . (A.20)
71
The value of ∂Cy
∂CPy
(CPey , C
Fe
y ) is equal to
∂Cy
∂CPy
=
[
[ψC ]
1
ξ [CPey ]
ξ−1
ξ + [1− ψC ] 1ξ [CFey ]
ξ−1
ξ
] 1
ξ−1
[ψC ]
1
ξ [CPey ]
− 1
ξ
=
ψC + ψC [1− ψC
ψC
] 1
ξ
[
CFey
CPey
] ξ−1
ξ

1
ξ−1
.
By using the value of C
Fe
y
CPey
(equation A.11),
∂Cy
∂CPy
=
[
ψC + ψC
[
1− ψC
ψC
] 1
ξ
[[
1− αrτ r]rS]ξ [1− ψC
ψC
]] ξ−1
ξ
] 1
ξ−1
=
[
ψC + [1− ψC ] [[1− αrτ r]rS]ξ−1] 1ξ−1 = [ψC
αψ
] 1
ξ−1
. (A.21)
Finally, by replacing the value ofCey (equation A.17) and
∂Cy
∂CPy
(equation A.21) into equation
A.20, it leads to
Hey =
[
W τy (H
e
y) + Ωy
[1 + τC ]p
] γ
η
[
ψC
αψ
] γ[1+η]
η[ξ−1]
[
[1− τwy (Hey)− τ payy ]wy
ψHy [1 + τ
C ]p
]γ
. (A.22)
Elasticities Here I calculate the wage and income elasticities of labor supply and the
wage elasticity of consumption, used in the wage equation and calibration process. For the
wage elasticity of labor supply, I first take the implicit derivative of equation A.22 with
respect to wy. Since
∂W τy
∂wy
=
∂wyH
e
y
∂wy
− [τwy + τ payy ]
∂Bey
∂wy
= [1− τwy − τ payy ]
[
Hey + wy
∂Hey
∂wy
]
, (A.23)
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∂Hey
∂wy
= Heyγ
[
[1− τwy − τ payy ]wy
ψHy [1 + τ
C ]p
]−1 1− τwy − τ payy − wyαwy
[
Hey + wy
∂Hy
∂wy
]
ψHy [1 + τ
C ]p

+Hey
γ
η
[
W τy + Ωy
[1 + τC ]p
]−1 1− τwy − τ payy
[1 + τC ]p
[
Hey + wy
∂Hey
∂wy
]
= Heyγ
 1
wy
−
αwy
[
Hey + wy
∂Hy
∂wy
]
1− τwy − τ payy
+Hey γη
[
1− τwy − τ payy
W τy + Ωy
] [
Hey + wy
∂Hey
∂wy
]
.
Thus,
∂Hey
∂wy
[
1 +Heyγ
αwy wy
1− τwy − τ payy
−Hey
γ
η
[1− τwy − τ payy ]wy
W τy + Ωy
]
= Heyγ
[
1
wy
− α
w
yH
e
y
1− τwy − τ payy
]
+Hey
γ
η
[
1− τwy − τ payy
W τy + Ωy
]
Hey ,
and
∂Hey
∂wy
= Hey
γ
[
1
wy
− αwy Hey
1−τwy −τ payy
]
+ γ
η
[
1−τwy −τ payy
W τy +Ωy
]
Hey
1 +Heyγ
[
αwy wy
1−τwy −τ payy
]
−Hey γη
[
[1−τwy −τ payy ]wy
W τy +Ωy
] .
As a result, the wage elasticity of labor supply, ΘHw, is equal to
ΘHw =
∂Hey
∂wy
wy
Hey
=
γ
[
1− αwy wyHey
1−τwy −τ payy
]
+ γ
η
[
[1−τwy −τ payy ]wyHwy
W τy +Ωy
]
1 + γ
[
αwy wyH
e
y
1−τwy −τ payy
]
− γ
η
[
[1−τwy −τ payy ]wyHey
W τy +Ωy
] . (A.24)
Note that in the case of αwy = 0 (the case with the flat tax) and η →∞, the wage elasticity
of labor supply is equal to γ.
Similarly, since
∂W τy
∂Ωy
= [1− τwy − τ payy ]
∂Bey
∂Ωy
= [1− τwy − τ payy ]wy
∂Hey
∂Ωy
,
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the implicit derivative of the labor supply with respect to non-wage income is such that
∂Hey
∂Ω
=
γ
η
Hey
[
[1− τwy − τ payy ]wy ∂Hy∂Ω + 1
W τy + Ωy
]
− γHey
[
αwwy
∂Hy
∂Ω
1− τwy − τ payy
]
.
Hence,
∂Hey
∂Ω
[
1− γ
η
Hey
[
[1− τwy − τ payy ]wy
W τy + Ωy
]
+ γHey
[
αwwy
1− τwy − τ payy
]]
=
γ
η
Hey
[
1
W τy + Ωy
]
,
and
∂Hey
∂Ω
=
γ
η
Hey
[
1
W τy +Ωy
]
1− γ
η
Hey
[
[1−τwy −τ payy ]wy
W τy +Ωy
]
+ γHey
[
αwwy
1−τwy −τ payy
] .
This leads to an income elasticity of labor supply, ΘHΩ, equal to
ΘHΩ =
∂Hey
∂Ω
Ω
Hey
=
γ
η
[
Ω
W τy +Ωy
]
1 + γ
[
αwwyHey
1−τwy −τ payy
]
− γ
η
[
[1−τwy −τ payy ]wyHey
W τy +Ωy
] (A.25)
Finally, to calculate the wage elasticity of consumption, ΘCw, the implicit derivative
∂Cey
∂wy
is
∂Cey
∂wy
=
1− τwy − τ payy
[1 + τC ]p
[
Hey + wy
∂Hey
∂wy
] [
ψC
αψ
] 1
ξ−1
,
which leads to
ΘCw =
∂Cey
∂wy
wy
Cey
=
[1− τwy − τ payy ]wy
W τy + Ωy
[
Hey + wy
Hey
wy
∂Hey
∂wy
wy
Hey
]
, or
ΘCw =
∂Cey
∂wy
wy
Cey
=
[1− τwy − τ payy ]wyHey
W τy + Ωy
[1 + ΘHw] ; (A.26)
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Unemployed individuals When the individual is unemployed, the Lagrangian is equal
to
L = [Cy]
1+ 1
η
1 + 1
η
+ χ
[
P τy + Ωy − Ey
]
, (A.27)
where
P τy = ρywyHy − τ¯yBuy , (A.28)
Buy = ρywyHy − ωded. (A.29)
The optimal values for present and future consumption are denoted by CPuy and C
Fu
y , res-
pectively. The first order conditions are
∂L
∂CPy
= [Cy(C
Pu
y , C
Fu
y )]
1
η
∂Cy
∂CPy
(CPuy , C
Fu
y )− χ[1 + τC ]p = 0 (A.30)
∂L
∂CFy
= [Cy(C
Pu
y , C
Fu
y )]
1
η
∂Cy
∂CFy
(CPuy , C
Fu
y )− χ
[1 + τC ]p
[1− αrτ r]rS = 0 (A.31)
∂L
∂χ
= P τy + Ωy − Ey(CPuy , CFuy ) = 0 (A.32)
Consumption Dividing (A.30) with (A.31) yields
CFuy
CPuy
=
[
[1− αrτ r]rS]ξ [1− ψC
ψC
]
. (A.33)
Using this equation (A.33), the expenditures equation (A.6) becomes
E(CPuy , C
Fu
y ) =
[1 + τC ]pCPuy
αψ
. (A.34)
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Replacing equation A.34 in the budget constraint, equation A.32, I obtain
CPuy =
αψ[P τy + Ωy]
[1 + τC ]p
. (A.35)
Equation A.35 along with equation A.11 lead to
CFuy =[1− αψ]
[1− αrτ r]rS[P τy + Ωy]
[1 + τC ]p
. (A.36)
From equations A.35 and A.36, the optimal consumption function when the individual
is unemployed, Cuy = Cy(C
Pu
y , C
Fu
y ) is equal to
Cuy =
P τy (H
e
y) + Ωy
[1 + τC ]p
[
αψ
ψC
] 1
1−ξ
. (A.37)
Savings Individual savings are equal to
Suy =
[1− αψ][P τy + Ωy]
pS
=
[
rS
pκκ
]
[1− αψ][P τy + Ωy]. (A.38)
Firms
Π = αv [αpi[pi − τpiBpi − δK] + δK − I] (A.39)
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Firms solve the constrained maximization of their value Π subject to I = δK. The value
pf Π is equal to
Π = αvαpi [pQ− [1 + τu]w¯eL− cvN − rD − τ proK
−τpi [pQ− τ proK − [1 + τu]w¯eL− cvN − αII − αdrD − αkδτKτ]− δK]
+ αvδK − αvI (A.40)
where,
αv =
1− αgτG
[1− αττ r]r (A.41)
αpi =
αX [1− αxτX ] + [1− αX ][1− αgτG]
1− αgτG . (A.42)
From the Beveridge equation (equation 2.35), e = µθ−βv/λ, the rate of employment in
terms of vacancies. Thus,
Π = αvαpi[1− τpi]pQ− αvαpi[1− τpi]
[
[1 + τu]w¯
µθ−β
λ
L
N
+ c
]
vN
− [αvαpi[1− τpi]τ pro + αvαpi[1− αdτpi]rαD + αvαpiδ − αvδ]K
− [αvαpiτpi[−αI − αk] + αv] I (A.43)
with
Q =
[
[ψQ]
1
K1−
1
 + [1− ψQ] 1 [eL]1− 1
] 
−1
. (A.44)
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Denote
φI =
1
1− τpi
[
τpi[−αI − αk] + 1
αpi
]
, (A.45)
φK = τ pro +
1− αdτpi
1− τpi rα
D +
1
1− τpi δ −
1
αpi[1− τpi]δ, and (A.46)
φL =
λ
µθ−β
cN
L
+ [1 + τu]w¯. (A.47)
These are the after-tax marginal cost of each factor of production: φK is the marginal cost
per additional unit of capital, and φL is the marginal cost per additional hour of employed
labor. Then, the first order conditions are:
∂Π
∂v
= αvαpi[1− τpi]
[
p
∂Q
∂v
−
[
µθ−β
λ
φLL
]]
= 0 (A.48)
∂Π
∂I
= −αvαpi[1− τpi]φI + χ = 0, (A.49)
∂Π
∂K
= αvαpi[1− τpi]p ∂Q
∂K
− αvαpi[1− τpi]φK − χδ = 0. (A.50)
That is,
p
∂Q
∂v
=
µθ−β
λ
φLL, (A.51)
p
∂Q
∂K
= φK + δφI , (A.52)
where
∂Q
∂K
=
[
[ψQ]
1
K1−
1
 + [1− ψQ] 1 [eL]1− 1
] 1
−1
[
ψQ
K
] 1

(A.53)
∂Q
∂v
=
[
[ψQ]
1
K1−
1
 + [1− ψQ] 1 [eL]1− 1
] 1
−1
[
1− ψQ
eL
] 1
 µθ−β
λ
L. (A.54)
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Capital The division of equations (A.52) and (A.51) leads to
[
ψQeL
[1− ψQ]K
] 1

=
φK + δφI
φL
. (A.55)
where the marginal rate of substitution, equals the ratio of factor costs. Equation (A.55)
leads to the optimal amount of capital as a function of the employment rate, which is
determined in the labor market, such that
K =
ψQeL
1− ψQ
[
φK(r) + δφI(r)
φL(w¯, θ)
]−
. (A.56)
Output After replacing equation A.56 in the production function, it leads to
Q =
[ψQ] 1 [ ψQeL
1− ψK
[
φK + δφI
φL
]−] −1
+ [1− ψQ] 1 [eL] −1


−1
=
eL
1− ψQ
[
ψQ
[
φK + δφI
φL
]1−
+ [1− ψQ]
] 
−1
.
Denote
αQ =
ψQ[φK + δφI ]1−
ψQ[φK + δφI ]1− + [1− ψQ][φL]1− . (A.57)
Then, the optimal production is equal to
Q =
eL
1− ψQ
[
1− αQ
1− ψQ
] 
1−
. (A.58)
Rents obtained from a vacancy filled The rents obtained from a vacancy filled are
measured by the marginal increase in the value of the firm due to an increase of employed
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individuals, ∂Π/∂eN , here denoted by Πf , and equal to
Πf =αvαpi[1− τpi]
[
p
∂Q
∂eN
− [1 + τu]w¯ L
N
]
. (A.59)
Since
∂Q
∂eN
=
[
[ψQ]
1
K1−
1
 + [1− ψQ] 1 [eL]1− 1
] 1
−1
[
1− ψQ
eL
] 1
 L
N
,
=
[
eL
1− ψQ
[
1− ψQ
1− αQ
] 
−1
] 1
 [
1− ψQ
eL
] 1
 L
N
,
=
[
1− αQ
1− ψQ
] 1
1− L
N
, (A.60)
equation A.59 can be also expressed as
Πf =αvαpi[1− τpi]
[
p
[
1− αQ
1− ψQ
] 1
1−
− [1 + τu]w¯
]
L
N
. (A.61)
A.1.2 Labor Market
Let rτ = [1− αrτ r]r. Solving the system of Bellman equations:
V ey = U
e
y + [1 + r
τ ]−1[λV uy + [1− λ]V ey ],
V uy = U
u
y + [1 + r
τ ]−1[µθ1−βV ey + [1− µθ1−β]V uy ],
V f = Πf + [1 + rτ ]−1[λV v + [1− λ]V f ],
V v = −c+ [1 + rτ ]−1[µθ−βV f + [1− µθ−β]V v],
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leads to
V ey =
1 + rτ
rτ
[
[rτ + µθ1−β]U ey + λU
u
y
rτ + µθ1−β + λ
]
, (A.62)
V uy =
1 + rτ
rτ
[
µθ1−βU ey + [r
τ + λ]Uuy
rτ + µθ1−β + λ
]
, (A.63)
V f =
1 + rτ
rτ
[
[rτ + µθ−β]Πf − λc
rτ + µθ−β + λ
]
, and (A.64)
V v =
1 + rτ
rτ
[
µθ−βΠf − [rτ + λ]c
rτ + µθ−β + λ
]
. (A.65)
Job creation
Using the free entry condition, V v = 0, in equation A.65, the result determines the equi-
librium between rents and costs of filling a vacancy, also known as job creation equation,
such that
Πf =
[rτ + λ]c
µθ−β
. (A.66)
After replacing Πf with equation A.61, it becomes
αvαpi[1− τpi]
[
p
[
1− αQ(θ)
1− ψQ
] 1
1−
− [1 + τu]w¯
]
L
N
=
[rτ + λ]c
µθ−β
, or
αvαpi[1− τpi]
[
p
[
1− αQ(θ)
1− ψQ
] 1
1−
− [1 + τu]w¯
]
eL =
[
1 +
rτ
λ
]
cvN
Wage determination
Rents and losses from changes in wages
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Marginal utility from a change in the wage of an employed individual The marginal
utility from a change in the wage of an employed individual is
∂U ey
∂wy
= [Cey ]
1
η
∂Cey
∂wy
− ψH [Hey ]
1
γ
∂Hey
∂wy
=
1
wy
[
[Cey ]
1+ 1
ηΘC,w − ψH [Hey ]1+
1
γ ΘH,w
]
. (A.67)
Equation A.67 is a function of consumption when the individual is employed and hours of
labor (equations A.17 and A.20), and wage elasticities of labor and consumption (equations
A.26 and A.24).
Marginal change in rents from a filled vacancy due to changes in the average wage
The marginal change in rents from a filled vacancy due to changes in the average wage is
∂Πf
∂w¯
= αvαpi[1− τpi] L
N
[
p
1
− 1
[
1− αQ
1− ψQ
] 1
1−
[
− 1
1− αQ
] [
−∂α
Q
∂w¯
]
− [1 + τu]
]
.
Given that
∂αQ
∂w¯
= −ψ
Q[φK ]1−[1− ψQ][1− ][φL]− ∂φL
∂w¯
[ψQ[φK ]1− + [1− ψQ][φL]1−]2 = −α
Q[1− αQ][1− ][φL]−1∂φ
L
∂w¯
,
(A.68)
then,
∂Πf
∂w¯
= αvαpi[1− τpi]
[
p
1
− 1
[
1− αQ
1− ψQ
] 1
1−
[
− 1
1− αQ
] [
αQ[1− αQ][1− ][φL]−1∂φ
L
∂w¯
]
L
N
−[1 + τu]] ,
= αvαpi[1− τpi]
[
p
[
1− αQ
1− ψQ
] 1
1−
[
αQ[φL]−1
∂φL
∂w¯
]
− [1 + τu]
]
L
N
.
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That is,
∂Πf
∂w¯
= αvαpi[1− τpi][1 + τu]
[
p
[
1− αQ(θ)
1− ψQ
] 1
1− αQ(θ)
φL(θ)
− 1
]
L
N
. (A.69)
The value of αQ and φL can be found in equations A.57 and A.47, respectively.
Wage equation The difference between equations A.62 and A.63, and equations A.64
and A.65 are equal to
V ey − V uy =
1 + rτ
rτ + µθ1−β + λ
[U ey − Uuy ], (A.70)
V f − V v = 1 + r
τ
rτ + µθ−β + λ
[Πf + c]. (A.71)
These differences determine the rents that can be obtained from the accepting the bargained
wage, compared with continue being unemployed, or leaving the vacancy still open.
The equilibrium wage is the result of the unconstrained optimization of the Nash bar-
gaining function
[V ey − V u]σ[V f − V v]1−σ (A.72)
with respect to w. The first order condition is
σ
∂V ey
∂wy
[V f − V v] + [1− σ]∂V
f
∂w¯
[V ey − V uy ] = 0, (A.73)
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where
∂V ey
∂wy
=
[1 + rτ ][rτ + µθ1−β]
rτ [rτ + µθ1−β + λ]
∂U ey
∂wy
, and (A.74)
∂V f
∂w¯
=
[1 + rτ ][rτ + µθ−β]
rτ [rτ + µθ−β + λ]
∂Πf
∂w¯
(A.75)
Plugging equations A.74 and A.75 in equation A.73, I obtain
[1− σ] [V ey − V uy ] = σ [ ∂U ey/∂wy−∂Πf/∂w¯
] [
V f − V v] . (A.76)
Using equations (A.70) and (A.71), I obtain the wage equation expressed as the surplus
obtained from changing to an employed status from being unemployed,
U ey = U
u
y +
σ
1− σ
[
∂U ey/∂wy
−∂Πf/∂w¯
] [
Πf + c
]
(A.77)
Equation A.77 is a function of U ey , U
u
y (equations 2.2 and 2.3), ∂U
e
y/∂wy, ∂Π
f/∂w¯ (equa-
tions A.67 and A.69), and Πf (equation A.59).
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A.1.3 Government
pG =
∑
y
Ny
[
τCp
[
eCPey + uC
Pu
y
]
+
τCp
[1− αrτ r]rS
[
eCFey + uC
Fu
y
]]
+
∑
y
Nyα
rτ rrSpS
[
eSey + uS
u
y
]
+
∑
y
Ny
[
αrτ rrAy + τ
MMy
]
+
∑
y
Ny τ¯y
[
eBey + uB
u
y
]
−
∑
y
Ny[1− αM ]My
+ τpiBpi + τ proK + αxτXX + αgτG[−Z] (A.78)
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